The fate of Heath's special investigation unit : an evaluation in terms of the separation of powers doctrine by Shackleford, Caroline Sara
THE FATE OF HEATH'S SPECIAL INVESTIGATING UNIT:
AN EVALUATION IN TERMS OF THE SEPARATION OF
POWERS DOCTRINE
Caroline Shackleford
Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the LLM
degree at the University of Stellenbosch
Supervisor: Prof LM du Plessis
March 2002
DECLARATION
I, the undersigned, hereby declare that the work contained in this thesis is my
own original work and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part






This thesis is a response to the judgment of the Constitutional Court in South
African Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath, in which certain provisions of the
Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act were subjected to
constitutional review. The outcome of the case was the striking down of certain
provisions of the Act as unconstitutional, and the removal of Judge Willem Heath
from his position as head of the Unit. The provisions were said to infringe upon the
principle of separation of powers, an implicit term of the Constitution of South
Africa. This principle affects the extent of the judicial power because of its
influence on determining the acceptability of extra-judicial functions. The doctrine
of separation of powers is therefore considered in its historical and theoretical
context, with particular reference to the way in which it tends to limit or define the
role of judges. Following this analysis, the status of institutions supporting
constitutional democracy is examined, and the legislation governing Special
Investigating Units is compared with that which regulates the office of the Public
Protector. As a result, some alternative legislative means of achieving the ends of





Hierdie tesis volg op die uitspraak van die Grondwetlike Hof in South African
Personal Injury Lawyers vHeath, waarin sekere bepalings van die Wet op Spesiale
Ondersoekeenhede en Spesiale Tribunale aan grondwetlike hersiening onderwerp
is. Die uitkoms van die saak was dat sekere ongrondwetlike bepalings van die Wet
ongeldig verklaar is, en dat Regter Willem Heath van sy posisie as hoof van die
Eenheid onthef is. Dit is bevind dat die bepalings die beginsel van skeiding van
magte, 'n implisiete term van die Suid-Afrikaanse Grondwet, geskend het. As
gevolg van sy invloed op die bepaling van aanvaarbaarheid van buite-juridiese
funksies, beïnvloed dié beginsel die omvang van die juridiese mag. Die skeiding
van magte leerstuk word dus in sy historiese en teoretiese konteks oorweeg, met
spesifieke verwysing na die manier waarop dit neig om die rol van regters te beperk
of te omskryf. Na hierdie analise word die status ondersoek van instellings wat
grondwetlike demokrasie ondersteun, en die wetgewing wat die Spesiale
Ondersoekeenhede beheer, vergelyk met dié wat die Openbare Beskermer reguleer.
Op grond hiervan word sekere alternatiewe wetgewende metodes voorgestelom die
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CHAPTER 1: SEPARATION OF POWERS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN
CONSTITUTION
1 1 BACKGROUND AND AIMS
This thesis sets out to consider the effect of the principle of separation of powers,
which is implicit in the South African Constitution, I on the extent of the judicial
power. In particular, the effect of the principle on judges' performance of extra-
judicial functions is analysed in detail. The emphasis falls mainly on the outcome
and implications of the Heath judgment.i which is examined in the context of other
relevant Constitutional Court decisions' and the theoretical roots of the separation
of powers doctrine.
Three stages may be distinguished in the accomplishment of this end. Firstly, the
origins of the separation of powers doctrine and its reception in South African law
are identified and discussed. In this section of the argument, the doctrine is
compared with and distinguished from similar theories, and its place in
constitutional jurisprudence considered, paying particular attention to the specific
form taken by the principle in its implementation in the Constitution. This includes
analysis of abstract theories, constitutional institutions and South African case law.
The principle influences the extent of powers in all three branches of government,
but in the second stage of the analysis it becomes clear that in this thesis the focus
is on its effect on the role of judges. In this part, the decisions of the Constitutional
Court concerning the extent of the judicial power and the function of judges receive
particular attention. These pronouncements are influenced not only by the
separation of powers doctrine referred to above, but also by historical factors, and
the need to preserve judicial independence.
I Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996
2 South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath 2001 (1) BCLR 77 (CC)
3 Bernstein v Bester 1996 (4) BCLR 449 (CC), Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional
Assembly: In re: Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (10) BCLR
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The final stage draws together the results of these two sections, in order to explain
the Constitutional Court's decision regarding the Heath's Special Investigating Unit
in terms of its earlier dicta on the constitutionality of extra-judicial activities, and
the extent of the judicial power under the new Constitution. During this stage,
recommendations aimed at finding an acceptable way of incorporating the functions
performed by the Unit into the existing constitutional order are put forward, so as to
keep these Units effective as combatants of maladministration and corruption.
The importance of the Heath decision lies in its being the first case in which
separation of powers was applied to the facts as an implied constitutional provision,
rather than by reference to Constitutional Principle VI, which formed part of the
interim Constitution." Furthermore, the facts of the Heath case, in which the fate of
Special Investigating Units established under the Special Investigating Units and
Tribunals Act' was decided, also add weight to the importance of the judgment.
Previous Constitutions, such as the 1961 Constitution6 and the 1983 Constitution7
had also provided for a division between three branches of government, namely the
legislature, executive and judiciary, with further subdivisions in the legislative and
executi ve branches.t In this sense, a species of separation of powers could be read
into these Constitutions," However, at that time the separation of powers principle
was applied under a dispensation in which Parliament, rather than the Constitution,
enjoyed sovereignty, and in which the executive branch of government was pre-
eminent.
1253 (CC), De Lange v Smuts NO 1998 (7) BCLR 779 (CC), S v Dodo 2001 (5) BCLR 423 (CC)
and S v Mamabo 2001 (5) BCLR 449 (CC).
4 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 ('Interim Constitution', repealed in
1996) Schedule 4 sets out the Constitutional Principles, which were entrenched in the Interim
Constitution.
s Act 74 of 1996
6 Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 32 of 1961
7 Republic of South Africa Constitution Act 110 of 1983
8 In terms of s68( 1) of the 1983 Constitution, for example, the judicial authority of the Republic was
vested in the Supreme Court of South Africa.
9 Essentially, this was the reasoning adopted in Heath (note 2 supra) par 21.
2
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Moreover, these earlier Constitutions did not have the status of supreme law and
contained no Bill of Rights, or expression of fundamental values. Despite the
inclusion in the preamble of national goals such as respecting and protecting the
human dignity, life, liberty and property of all, and upholding the independence of
the judiciary and the equality of all under the law," the attainment of these goals
was the prerogative of the Parliament, and the application of the separation of
powers principle was also left to the discretion of Parliament. This meant that the
division of powers and functions between the various branches and organs of state
could not be challenged in the courts, unless the constitutionally or legislatively
required formalities had not been followed. I I
However, since the advent of constitutional supremacy in South Africa, the
separation of powers doctrine has manifestly become a substantively justiciable
principle of South African law, and has been called upon in numerous
constitutional challenges to legislation and executive acts.'? The Heath case itself is
a highly controversial example of such a challenge, based in part on the alleged
infringement of the principle.
The challenge was aimed at the performance of certain functions, said to fall
outside the limits of the judicial power, Dy a judge of the High Court, as head of a
Special Investigating Unit. The Constitutional Court, recognising the separation of
powers principle as an implicit constitutional provision, upheld the challenge,
ruling that a High Court judge may no longer serve as head of a Special
Investigating Unit. 13
10 See especially the 1983 Constitution (note 7 supra) - the latter goal is also found in the preamble
of the 1961 Constitution (note 6 supra).
II In terms of the 1983 Constitution s34, "no court of law [was] competent to inquire into or
pronounce upon the validity of an Act of Parliament," except in cases of non-compliance with
constitutional formalities.
12 For example, De Lange v Smuts NO (note 3 supra) and Executive Council of the Western Cape
Legislature v President of the RSA 1995 (10) BCLR 1289 (CC), as well as the more recent cases at
note 3.
13 SAAPIL v Heath (note 2 supra) par 70
3
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The Court makes it clear that the role of judges in South Africa and the limits of
their functions have been affected by the doctrine of separation of powers.l" since
the adoption of a supreme Constitution that gives deliberate expression to this
principle. It is also apparent that, since the demise of parliamentary sovereignty,
legislation cannot assign any role it chooses to a judge, but the Constitutional Court
has the final say in defining constitutional limits of the judicial function. It is still
uncertain whether the new role of judges should be more or less extensive than it
previously was. It is quite conceivable that some judicial functions have been
extended, while others are now more limited. This leads us to the question
postulated by this thesis, namely, how does the principle of separation of powers,
implicit in the Constitution, affect the extent of the judicial role and the
performance of extra-judicial functions by judges in South Africa?
The historical reasons for the incorporation of a separation of powers into the South
African model of state are examined later in the thesis. IS At this stage, however, it
is important to note that no explicit reference to the doctrine had been made in any
Constitution or other legislation affecting the model of governance until 1993,
when the principle found expression in Constitutional Principle VI.16 In order to be
certified by the newly created Constitutional Court/7 the final version of the
Constitution had to comply with these principles, which had the force of
constitutional provisions under the interim Constitution. This fmal text does not
refer expressly to separation of powers, but was found to comply with the
requirements of Constitutional Principle VI.18
14 Par 33, which contains the statement: "What is now permissible must be determined in the light of
our new Constitution, and not necessarily by past practices."
15 See especially chapter 2 below.
16 Note 4 supra. This Constitutional Principle states: "There shall be a separation of powers between
the legislature, executive and judiciary, with appropriate checks and balances to ensure
accountability, responsiveness and openness."
17 Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re: Certification of the Constitution of
the Republic of South Africa (note 3 supra). The Constitutional Court was created in terms of the
interim Constitution (note 4 supra), which required certification of the new text in terms of s74.
18 Certification case (note 3 supra) especially par 113
4
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1 2 MOTIV ATION, METHODS AND ASSUMPTIONS
This thesis deals with possible changes to the role of judges relating to their
performance of extra-judicial functions. These functions, though not strictly
adjudicative, are an aspect of the judicial power, and it is this form of power which
is exercised by judges serving on presidential commissions of inquiry or the
Judicial Service Commission. Although many examples of extra-judicial activities
performed by a judges exist, one particular instance becomes the focus of this
thesis, namely Heath's role as head of a Special Investigating Unit, investigating
corruption in the state administration.
The legislation governing the Special Investigating Units granted wide investigative
powers to the person heading up the Unit. It also required that this person should be
a judge of the High Court. In effect, this extended the role of judges by adding a
new kind of extra-judicial function to the judicial power, though only under special
circumstances in which a judge was appointed as head of a Unit. However, now
that judges have constitutional powers of review over legislation and the conduct of
the executive, any changes to the role of judges are also subject to the scrutiny of
the Constitutional Court.
This is controversial, partly because judges are not elected by the population at
large, making their exercise of power potentially contrary to the popular will," and
more specifically because in South Africa, they seem to represent the minority that
used to have control over the country before the transition to democracy.i" The
19 This issue finds its best-known expression in the legal problem known as the 'counter-
majoritarian dilemma'.
20 Sprigman & Osborne "Du Plessis is not Dead: South Africa's 1996 Constitution and the
Application of the Bill of Rights to Private Disputes" SAJHR 1999 (15) 25 at 51 refer to this
problem as follows: "[T[here is a pungent irony in the fact that those who claim to be personally
committed to a progressive social and economic agenda, at the very moment when the legislature is
for the first time firmly in the hands of the majority of South Africans, would so energetically
advocate a massive enlargement of the judicial power." The impact of this accusation on the Court's
interpretation of its role must be significant. See however the remarks of Corbett CJ in 1993,
rejecting accusations that the judiciary was illegitimate and did not represent the population as a
whole, stating: "I do not think these general attacks upon the judiciary are well-founded or that they
5
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conflict is immediately evident in the Heath decision, in which the legislature's
decision to assign this additional function to members of the judiciary was found to
be unconstitutional and therefore invalid.
Notwithstanding this unfortunate state of affairs, the need for an independent
judiciary, which is not subject to the will of the people or the control of their
democratically elected representatives, is constitutionally recognised." The
Constitutional Court has also made it clear that it does not regard the will of the
majority as sovereign, but rather affords that status to the Constitution." Strict
limitations on judicial and extra-judicial functions, at least according to the
supporters of such restrictions, can enhance perceptions of the independence of the
. d" 23JU iciary.
The question of how far the judicial power should extend is therefore highly
relevant to the legitimacy, or perceived legitimacy, of the judicial branch of
government. As becomes evident when the existing case law and other sources are
consulted, there is no neat, obvious or clear-cut solution to this problem.
Engagement with the issue in the form of an academic paper, which contributes to
the debate on the subject, constitutes recognition of the notion that any definition of
the extent of the judicial power should be provisional and subject to review. Even
the Constitutional Court has demonstrated a reluctance to offer a clear test for
determining the limits of the judicial function, stating:
contribute constructively to the proper and efficient administration of justice in this country"
Business Day 7 September 1993.
21 Constitution (note 1 supra) s 165, especially ss (2) and (3).
22 S vMakwanyane1995 (6) BCLR 665(CC) par 88 in which the Chaskalson P held that public
opinion is "no substititute for the duty vested in the Courts to interpret the Constitution and to
uphold its provisions without fear or favour." He also asserts that "[i]fpublic opinion were to be
decisive there would be no need for Constitutional adjudication."
23 Mason "Extra-judicial work for judges: the views of Chief Justice Stone" Harvard Law Review 67
(1953) 193-216 at 205, describing the reaction of newspapers to Stone's refusal to participate in a
commission of inquiry, reports columnist Frank R. Kent: "To have acted differently would have
encouraged a practice that already has detracted from the dignity of the court."
6
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"It is undesirable, particularly at this stage of the development of our
jurisprudence concerning the separation of powers, to lay down rigid
tests for determining whether or not the performance of a particular
function by a judge is or is not compatible with the judicial office. ,,24
The role of the Constitution in determining the boundaries of the judicial function is
also problematic. Certain extra-judicial functions to be performed by judges are
prescribed by the Constitution.f and it is therefore not helpful to restrict the
definition of the judiciary's role simply to whatever can be defined as 'judicial'.
Moreover, while it is clear that the extent of the judicial role is determined by the
text of the Constitution, the text requires interpretation, and interpretation does not
happen in a vacuum, but inevitably takes into account the historical and
contemporary context in which it is performed.
The Constitutional Court also cautions against an overly abstract approach to
interpretation in its dictum in S v Dodo/" quoting an American authority on the
separation of powers, Prof Laurence H Tribe, on the need to use the constitutional
text as the primary source informing interpretation of the principle:
"We must therefore seek an understanding of the Constitution's
separation of powers not primarily in what the Framers thought, nor in
what Enlightenment political philosophers wrote, but in what the
Constitution itself says and does.',27
It is assumed in this thesis that the new dispensation, in which the Constitution is
supreme, does bring with it a new role for judges, and that this role is not rigidly
cast, but develops in accordance with the developing constitutional interpretation of
the principle of separation of powers, as well as other relevant factors. A further
24 Heath (note 2 supra) par 31
25 An example is the s 86(2) duty of the President of the Constitutional Court to preside over the
election of the President of the RSA.
26 Note 3 supra.
7
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
assumption is that the introduction of this principle does not mean that the
traditional judicial role, in which 'extra-judicial' functions were performed, must
necessarily be restricted to entail only adjudication or constitutional interpretation.
It is also possible to 'uphold and protect the Constitution ,28 through involvement in
other activities.
The value of this thesis derives mainly from the accomplishment of its aim to
investigate the role of judges, and the limits of the judicial power, but it also
contributes in a more general way to the debate surrounding separation of powers
jurisprudence, and its relation to constitutional supremacy. At a more practical
level, it draws certain conclusions concerning the Special Investigating Units
legislation, and makes a number of recommendations about how this legislation
might be reformed or the Units incorporated into other existing structures, such as
the Auditor-General, or Public Protector's office.
The primary method used in this thesis is a critical analysis of cases and legislation
relevant to separation of powers, the Special Investigating Units and related
matters, including the approach to the doctrine in certain other countries. The
historical and theoretical context of the separation of powers doctrine is also briefly
examined.
1 3 SEQUENCE OF CHAPTERS
Although the structure of this thesis coincides broadly with the three stages of
argument introduced above.i" each chapter contains a distinct line of argument,
which may contribute to the overall argument in more than one way, as indicated in
this section.
27 Par 17, quoting with approval from LH Tribe American Constitutional Law I (2000) (3 ed) 127
28 Constitution (note 1 supra) Schedule 2 Item 6
29 Section 1 1
8
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This chapter presents an outline of the thesis, describing the background to the
problem that gave rise to the research question addressed in the rest of the chapters
and exploring the relevance of this question in the context of the current debate
about the role of judges. It indicates the methodology and expected outcome of the
analysis, and contains an explanation of terms used in the thesis.
Chapter two presents the theoretical basis for the doctrine of separation of powers,
explaining its historical origins and rationale. This chapter also briefly examines
how the doctrine is applied in other jurisdictions, how it came to be incorporated in
South Africa's model of government, and specifically, as demonstrated in recent
case law, how it affects the judicial role in this country. It therefore touches on both
the general question of the separation of powers doctrine, and its contribution to the
role of judges by securing the value of judicial independence.
In chapter three, the development in the Constitutional Court's approach to
interpretation of the doctrine of separation of powers is traced, from the inception
of the Court to the present. This entails an analysis of the relevant case law, in
which the Court's professed and actual interpretive approaches are compared. One
of the key issues in this chapter is the status of the separation of powers principle,
and whether it should be considered separately from the Constitution, or only as it
finds expression in the text. It is interesting to note that, while the Court generally
endorses the latter alternative, this endorsement is not always supported in its
interpretive practice.
Chapter four constitutes a further analysis of some of the cases examined in chapter
three, this time with a view to understanding how separation of powers affects the
question of judicial independence and the role of judges. The principle affects
judges differently in different countries. For example, in the USA, the doctrine is
grounded on the issue of protection of the individual from the abuse of state power,
with the effect that the limitation of state functions, including the judicial power,





In South Africa, the focus is rather on preserving the independence of the judiciary
and ensuring accountable and responsive government. This chapter looks at the
Heath judgment in particular,'? as part of the attempt to determine how the
principle fmds application to the role of South African judges, and also examines
other Constitutional Court cases in which the effect of the separation of powers
principle on the judicial role was considered, such as S v Dodo and S v
Mamabolo.31
Chapter five draws together both strands of argument in order to assess the position
of the Special Investigating Units. Insights into the separation of powers doctrine
gleaned from history and the interpretive approach of the Court, as well as
historical and judicial views on the practical implications of the doctrine for the
judicial role are employed to achieve this end. The legislation governing the Units
is compared to the legislation governing the Public Protector. This leads to a
consideration of the place of the Units in the context of the structure of South
Africa's government, as outlined in the Constitution. The outcome of the Heath
decision, and its effect on the status and functioning of Special Investigating Units
is addressed, and a number of recommendations about possible reforms are made.
1 4 CLARlFICA TION OF TERMS
"Pure doctrine of separation of powers" - this term is used to refer to the strict
definition of the doctrine, which requires separation of functions and membership
of the branches, formulated as follows:
"It is essential for the establishment and maintenance of political liberty
that the government be divided into three branches or departments, the
legislature, the executive, and the judiciary. To each of these branches
there is a corresponding identifiable function of government, legislative,
executive, or judicial. Each branch of the government must be confined
30 Note 2 supra.
31 Note 3 supra.
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to the exercise of its own function and not allowed to encroach upon the
functions of the other branches. Furthermore, the persons who compose
these three agencies of government must be kept separate and distinct,
no individual being allowed to be at the same time a member of more
than one branch.?"
"Abstract principle of separation of powers" - this refers to the doctrine as
formulated in CP VI,33 which finds expression in the constitutional text. However,
this formulation of the principle is not directly expressed in the text, which is rather
a practical embodiment of the non-specific principle.
"Separation of powers" - this refers to the principle as generally encountered in
practice, with relaxations of various requirements mentioned in the pure doctrine,
such as extra government branches or institutions, extra functions for members of
the various branches, overlapping functions, and membership of more than one
branch at a time. A possible formulation might be:
"The functions of government may be horizontally divided into the
legislative, executive, and judicial. These branches should be separate
from and accountable to each other, and no one branch should be
allowed to take over the functions of another branch."
"Implicit constitutional provision" - this term is used for the unexpressed principle
of separation of powers, in preference to the term "tacit provision". This is
explained as follows in Heath:
"In the law of contract a distinction is drawn between tacit and implied
terms. The former refers to terms that the parties intended but failed to
express in the language of the contract, and the latter, to terms implied
by law. The making of such a distinction in this judgment might be
understood as endorsing the doctrine of original intent, which this Court
32 Vile Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers (1967) 13
33 Note 16 supra.
11
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has never done. I prefer, therefore, to refer to unexpressed terms as
being 'implied' or 'implicit' .,,34
It appears that the implied term or provision referred to by the court is not a
reference to the specific formulation used in CP VI, but rather to a general
formulation of separation of powers, as practiced in most Western democratic
states.
34 Heath (note 2 supra) par 19
12
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CHAPTER 2: THE ORIGINS OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE AND
ITS INFLUENCE ON THE ROLE OF JUDGES
2 1 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to explain the decision regarding the role of
judges in the Heath case' by referring to traditional definitions of the separation
of powers and the judicial function, drawn from a long history of political and
social theory. The question asked is what preconceptions derived from the pre-
constitutional dispensation, inform current views on the role of a judge, and how
these preconceptions affect the way in which the newly defined judicial role,
assigned by the Constitution.i is interpreted. The process whereby the principle
came to be incorporated into the text of the Constitution is also considered.
In the following chapter, different approaches to interpretation of the principle
of separation of powers in the Constitution are analysed, to determine the
impact of the new Constitution on the role of judges. However, the
constitutional text itself is not the only determinant of the courts' understanding
of this role. As was evident in Heath's case, numerous other considerations,
including abstract formulations of the doctrine of separation of powers and the
extent of the judicial role in foreign jurisdictions, are also taken into account. 3
It is also important to realise that although the South African common law is
based on Roman-Dutch principles, the judicial system and our court procedures
have more in common with the British common law system." It is therefore
worth examining the role of judges in Britain and other Anglo-American legal
systems, in order to establish the extent of the British influence on our
conception of the central mission of the judiciary.
Separation of powers is a political theory originally conceived by Enlightenment
philosophers and political theorists as a means of limiting the absolute power of
1 South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath 2001 (1) BCLR 77 (CC)
2 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996
3 Note 1 supra par 29-30
4 This dates back to British colonial rule, in terms of which it was common practice to
implement British judicial structures, while preserving the legal principles of the colony
13
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the state, and guaranteeing the liberty of the individual. This ideal was to be
achieved by distributing state authority among three separate branches, namely
the judicial, executive and legislative branches of government, each with its
own particular functions and officials, so that no person or group could establish
dominance in all spheres of government.
In Britain, before the emergence of this theory, absolute state power had also
previously been concentrated in the hands of monarchs. Later, as a result of
much conflict between the crown and its subjects, especially the wealthy
landowners and nobility, the legislative function was separated from other state
functions and vested in Parliament. 5 The crown retained the power to pass and
execute judgments, as well as seeing to state administrative and other public
functions. A further separation of the judicial and executive powers occurred in
the eighteenth century in response to Locke's argument that judges should be
independent and impartial. His was a resolutely libertarian position, aimed at
setting limits to royal power, and protecting individual liberty and property from
the potential abuses of the crown."
However, the separation of powers doctrine was not the only influential political
theory holding currency at this early democratic stage, and it should be clear
already that the initial separation of powers was not the now familiar tripartite
one, but rather a two-way separation between Parliament and the crown.
Moreover, two concomitant theories, the more ancient theory of mixed
government, and later the practice-oriented doctrine of checks and balances,
also gained in popularity during the Enlightenment, which, with its predilection
concerned. Britain was an influential colonial power in much of Southern Africa, including
South Africa itself.
5 This was a result of the 'Glorious Revolution' of 1688. Prior to this, in 1215, the nobility had
succeeded in gaining some rights against the monarchy, expressed in the Magna Carta, which is
traditionally thought of as England's first constitutional document. Only a small part of the
population was represented in the Parliament at this time, but representation was extended by
degrees, and eventually full democracy achieved in 1928 when women obtained voting rights on
the same terms as men.
6 However, the British judiciary is still closely associated with the crown, and there is a
significant tension between their perceived independence, and their alliance with the royal
power, evident even in recent cases, such as M v Home Office 1994 (1) AC 377. In this case, the
issue was whether the courts have jurisdiction to hold government ministers in contempt, and
the House of Lords' positive answer relied on the notion of severability necessary to make sense
of the question 'can the crown be in contempt of the crown?'
14
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for a minimalist state, ushered in the era of liberal capitalist democracy in the
West.
These three dominant theories were frequently combined in the political
dispensations of the time, and are often still found in combination now.
However, there are significant differences in their characteristics, and they share
only the primary purpose of preventing a single person or group from becoming
oppressively dominant and despotic. In the next part of this chapter, the origins
and development of these theories are traced, which will assist in the
identification of elements of these theories within South Africa's constitutional
dispensation.
It is not disputed that the performance of extra-judicial tasks has been expected
of judges in South Africa in the past, 7 and is also encountered in other
countries, such as the USA and UK. 8 In South Africa, these tasks have included
the delimitation of electoral constituencies and service on commissions of
inquiry, while in the UK judges are commonly called upon to serve on Royal
Commissions or on departmental committees, investigating controversial
questions or reviewing legislation. The law lords are also directly involved in
the legislative process."
In the USA, judges have tended to tum down invitations to serve on committees
appointed by the executive.i" Nonetheless, they have never been completely
exempted from extra-judicial work, and Justice Robert H. Jackson was named
as the US prosecutor at the Nuremburg trials, much to the dismay of the Chief
Justice of that time, Harlan F. Stone. I I Judges of the High Court of Australia
7 See especially Kahn "Extra-Judicial Activities of Judges" De Jure (1980) 188 at 199, where he
states: "There has never been a time in the history of this country when judges have confined
themselves to ... 'the function of a judge, and his only function, [which] is to determine in a
binding way issues between subject and subject or subject and Crown [state] according to
established rules of law and to make rulings and decisions that are binding on the parties to the
suit' ."
8 See Madison, Hamilton & Jay The Federalist Papers (1987) for the US, and Vile
Constitutionalism and Separation of Powers (1967) for the UK position.
9 Stevens Law and Politics (1979) 262 - see also 84, 184 and 615
10 Kahn (note 5 supra) 214
IIMason "Extra-judicial Work for Judges: the Views of Chief Justice Stone" Harvard Law
Review 67(2) 1953 193 at 213 "For Stone, Jackson's participation in the Nuremberg trials
combined three major sources of irritation: disapproval in principle of non-judicial work, strong
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have also withheld themselves from participation in committees appointed by
the executive, but have occasionally performed diplomatic and other
administrative functions, and in many Australian states Supreme Court judges
have served on commissions of inquiry.V
2 2 HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE JUDICIAL ROLE: MONTESQUIEU AND
LOCKE
Prior to the establishment of constitutionally governed states with a supreme
fundamental law, the Western world was already beginning to depart from
absolute monarchy as a political system. This was particularly evident in the
field of political philosophy, with thinkers of the early eighteenth century, such
as Locke and Montesquieu, providing justifications for these changes in the
format of the state and formulating their views on the necessity for an
independent judiciary with no interest in the disputes heard.v' At that time,
government was widely supposed to be primarily, even totally, judicial in
nature, with legislating, judging and execution all aimed at the discovery and
interpretation of the pre-existent natural law, or the law of God, depending on
the dominant religious perspective.i"
The separation of the judicial function from the legislative and executive
functions of state was initially seen as a way of setting limits to royal power, IS
and was derived from the ancient Greek and Roman theory of mixed
government, rather than from the separation of powers doctrine as such. This
theory, which predates separation of powers by many centuries, is an expression
of the belief that different classes in society should all take part in the functions
of government, so that the powers of the monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy
objection to the trials on legal and political grounds, the inconvenience and increased burden of
work entailed."
12210 and 211
lJ This derives from the Roman law maxim 'Nemo iudex in re sua', which is one of the
fundamental principles of natural justice.
14 Vile Constitutionalism (note 8 supra) especially 1-75, for a fascinating explication of the
developments in the competing theories of separation of powers, checks and balances, mixed
government and the balanced constitution, as the historical shifts from the mediaeval conception




are balanced. In terms of the separation of powers doctrine, these classes were
sometimes identified with the executive, judiciary, and legislature
respectively.l"
However, contrary to the separation of powers ideal of a government in which
each branch functions independently of the others, mixed government requires
joint participation in these functions, with the emphasis falling on "the
sovereignty of law over the ruler,,,!7 rather than the confinement of certain
branches to particular functions. This interpretation of the rule of law was
derived from Aristotle's assertions that "law should be sovereign on every issue,
and the magistrates and the citizen body should only decide about details" since
"law can do no more than generalise't.i''
Montesquieu's view of the judicial role, on the other hand, may be seen as a
clear expression of the separation of powers doctrine, in that he requires a
division between the judiciary and the other branches of government, stating:
"Again, there is no liberty, if the judicial power be not separated
from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the
legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to
arbitrary control; for the judge would be then the legislator. Were it
joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with violence
and oppression.?'"
This view of the judge as adjudicator rather than law-giver, concerned with
the law as it stands and not the politics which gives rise to it, has been
particularly influential in Anglo-American legal systems, in which the court
procedures are adversarial, and judges tend to be reluctant to make the
1633
1723
18 Aristotle Politics IV and Ethics V respectively, quoted in Vile Constitutionalism (note 8
supra) 23. The influence of this idea of the generality of law, which must be applied in
individual cases by an autonomous and disinterested judge, is still being feit - see S v Dodo 2001
(5) BCLR 423 (CC) par 26
19 Montesquieu The Spirit of the Laws 1(1949) 152
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"descent into the political arena.,,20 Furthermore, although the implied
distinction between law and politics brought about by this interpretation of
the separation of powers doctrine has been consistently controversial.t' it has
nonetheless consistently been upheld as an ideal, especially in legal systems
where parliamentary sovereignty prevails.22 Judges have frequently relied on
the argument that "political power should be disposed of by 'the people'"
and "judges, as appointed officials, should be diffident in the exercise of their
power.,,23
In addition to his recognition of the need for judicial independence, and
insistence that the judiciary should be prevented from usurping political
power, Montesquieu advocates a greater flexibility in the appointment of
judges. He addresses the 'counter-majoritarian dilemma' alluded to above, by
incorporating a rotational system in which people take it in turns to serve as
judges, as well as a privilege to be afforded to accused persons to have some
choice as to who should try their cause. He also proposes the introduction of
a democratising element, in his assertion that "judges ought likewise to be of
the same rank as the accused, or, in other words, his peers.,,24
These ideas have been implemented to a certain extent in countries such as
the USA, where citizens are called upon to perform jury duty, and parties
may reject jurors on particular grounds, thereby exercising a degree of
choice. In South Africa too, the desirability of a system of judgment by one's
peers has gained currency, despite the professionalism of the judiciary, in the
20 Nicolson "Ideology and the South African judicial process - Lessons from the past" SAJHR
1992 (8) 50 54.
21 Stevens 1979 (note 9 supra) 14 remarks that the eighteenth century "demand for pure
democracy, which was to take its most extreme forms in France and the North American
colonies ... [led in England] to the Reform Act of 1832...which permanently destroyed the
political balance among King, Lords and Commons ... and the inevitable tension between law
and politics developed."
22 "All [Lords of Appeal hearing constitutional cases between 1940 and 1955] in different ways
took the view that parliamentary sovereignty implied that there should be no serious judicial
~uestioning not only of acts of Parliament, but of decisions of the Civil Service." 388-389
2 Cameron "Judicial Accountability in South Africa" SAJHR 1989 (5) 251
24 Montesquieu 1949 153
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institution of lay assessors, who may sit with a judge in order to assist the
judge in better understanding the accused's situation.f
Locke's part in the development of the doctrine of separation of powers as an
influential theory, expounded by Montesquieu and others, is undeniable,
although he was by no means the originator of the theory, and did not write
the final word on the subject. Locke's theoretical point of departure was the
system of parliamentary sovereignty. He did not support the pure doctrine of
separation of powers, but attempted to expand it by modifying it with other
elements of his theory. He felt that it was rather unsophisticated at the time,
as it did not display "much appreciation of the complex inter-relationships of
a system of government the functions of which are divided up among several
. ,,26agencies.
However, Locke's expanded theory sometimes appears confused in its use of
terminology. Although he emphasises the necessity of independent judges, he
also at times identifies the judiciary with the legislature or executive, for
example in his statement that "the function of the legislature is to 'dispense
justice' .,,27 Another example of this apparent confusion of the branches is
found when he advocates a separation between legislature and executive. He
cites as his reason that if a monarch has "both Legislative and Executive
power in himself alone, there is no Judge to be found, no Appeal lies open to
anyone, who may fairly, and indifferently, and with Authority decide.,,28
Despite these difficulties, it is apparent that Locke was much concerned with
the independence of judges, and saw his theory, in which the complex
balancing of the inter-related powers of government was imperative, as a way
of ensuring their status as independent arbiters. His conception of the judicial
function is too closely connected with the other branches of state for it to
25 Barrow The Criminal Procedure Act 1998 (10 ed) 70. An assessor is defined in sI45(1)(b) as
"a person who, in the opinion of the judge who presides at the trial, has experience in the
administration of justice or skill in any matter which may be considered at the trial." The
Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944, s93 ter also provides for assessors to assist magistrates at
civil hearings, but in an advisory capacity only.




assist In identifying the acceptable limits of the judicial role, but his
recognition of the complexity of this exercise is a valuable insight which has
influenced the development of theories dealing with this issue. In the next
part of this chapter, therefore, later theories of separation of powers and
checks and balances influenced by Locke are explored further in their
historical context.
23 SEPARATION OF POWERS AND CHECKS AND BALANCES
Vile's formulation of a strict or pure doctrine of separation of powers identifies
two elements of pure separation of powers. Firstly, the functions of government
must be divided between the three branches of state, and there may be no
sharing of functions or any encroachment of one branch upon another. No less
important is the second element, which does not allow overlapping membership
of more than one branch, so that no single group of people may hold power in
two or more agencies of government. 29 In practice, however, the two elements
have rarely occurred in this pure form.
If instead, therefore, a practice-oriented document is considered, such as The
Federalist Papers, a collection of the arguments prepared by supporters of the
original Constitution of the USA, the following pronouncement on the meaning
of the maxim requiring a separation of state powers is found:
"The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and
judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and
whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be
pronounced the very definition of tyranny. ,,30
The writers then go on to point out that the most famous proponent of
separation of powers, Montesquieu, used as an illustration of his theory the
British political system, in which instances of overlapping membership of
28 Locke Second Treatise part VII par. 90-91, quoted in Vile Constitutionalism (note 8 supra) 61
29 This formulation, found in Vile (note 8 supra) 13, is quoted in part 1 4 of chapter 1 supra.
30 Madison, Hamilton & Jay The Federalist Papers Number XLVII (note 8 supra) 303
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different branches, and partial control over the functions of other branches,
abound. This suggests that, although the pure formulation of separation of
powers provides a sound theoretical basis, the pure doctrine does not require
a strict application in practice, provided that there is an effective means "to
provide some practical security for each [branch of state], against the
invasion of the others.,,3l These practical concerns are a feature of the
discourse on how to implement an effective separation of powers, since the
mere existence of a supreme Constitution is of no value, unless that
supremacy is respected and enforced.
However, since the duty of interpreting the Constitution falls to the judicial
branch, the judiciary might in effect become the supreme branch of
government, if there were a completely rigid separation of powers, with no
scope for checks and balances on each branch by the others. For this reason
the authors of The Federalist Papers conclude that "the interior structure of
the government [must be contrived so] that its several constituent parts may,
by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper
places.,,32
Of course, it is important to remember the comments of the South African
Constitutional Court in S v Dodo, referring to the danger of placing too much
emphasis on what the framers of the Constitution, or the Enlightenment
political philosophers wrote, that "[w]hat counts is not any abstract theory of
separation of powers, but the actual separation of powers 'operationally
defined by the Constitution ,,, (emphasis in originalj."
Nonetheless, in any interpretation of the Constitution, a principle such as
separation of powers, which was one of the founding principles against
which the constitutional text was tested, and which has been recognised in
South Africa as an implicit constitutional term." must carry a certain amount
31 Number XLVIII p.309
32 Number LI p.318-9
33 Note 18 supra par 17, in which Tribe American Constitutional Law 1(2000) (3 ed) 127 is
cited.
34 Heath (note 1 supra) par 20
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of interpretive weight. Abstract theories may inform our understanding of the
judicial role, especially where the Constitution remains silent on whether a
particular function is compatible with the role of the judiciary or not.
Moreover, the way in which the separation of powers doctrine had to be
implemented in the South African Constitution, was in combination with a
theory of checks and balances "to ensure accountability, responsiveness and
openness'v" This connection between the theory of checks and balances and
the value of public accountability is well-established, and the United States
Judge Bland, who is known for his opposition to the judicial review of
legislation, expresses the connection in this context in the following terms:
"A constitutional limitation is then, the voice of the people addressed to the
public agents respectively, in relation to their separate and distinct duties ...
for the exercise of which they are accountable only to the people.v'"
Although the South African Constitution expressly provides for judicial powers
of review, these comments are interesting in that they presuppose a wider
community in which the limitations imposed by the Constitution on the
branches of state may be interpreted and reviewed. The fact that Constitutional
Principle VI refers directly to public accountability as a goal of separation of
powers and checks and balances, suggests that, in South Africa, the public
might also playa part in providing a check on the exercise of state power.37
However, the context in which these constitutional reforms have taken place is
one in which it has been "an article of faith in the judiciary that a judge's duty is
to apply 'the law' ,,,38 and in which consideration of policy was said to be
beyond the judicial domainr" Moreover, in many cases the ideal of judicial
35 Constitutional Principle VI: "There shall be a separation of powers between the legislature,
executive and judiciary, with appropriate checks and balances to ensure accountability,
responsiveness and openness."
36 Bland The Opinion of Judge Bland on the Right of the Judiciary to dec/are an act of Assembly
Unconstitutional and also, on the Constitutionality of the Act investing the County Courts with
Equity Jurisdiction 24 quoted in Haines The American Doctrine of Judicial Review (1959) 266.
37 See in this regard Kriegler J's comments in S v Mamabolo 2001 (5) BCLR 449 (CC) par 15
and 29-30.
38 Cameron 1989 (note 23 supra) 259. See also R v Milne & Erleigh (6) 1951 (1) SA 1 (A) 11-
12 Centlivres CJ: "[A judge's] duty is to administer the law as it exists."
39 Nicolson 1992 (note 20 supra) 63
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neutrality was used to hide the 'inarticulate premises' on which court decisions
were based.4o This formalist or positivist way of thinking has been the subject of
much criticism," but the blame for the positivist approach cannot be laid
exclusively at the door of parliamentary sovereignty.
Even the Constitutional Court's extraordinary role in the adoption of South
Africa's Constitution, which had to be certified by the Court as complying with
the Constitutional Principles before it could be considered valid and operational
as the supreme law, should not be seen as guaranteeing a difference in the
courts' general approach. The principles, and the Constitution once validated,
could still be seen simply as rules to be applied to cases coming before the
courts. Although these texts seem, in their open-ended formulation, to demand
value judgments in their interpretation, and ethical as opposed to merely legal
choices in their application, a court might just as easily restrict its interpretation
to a literalist reading of constitutional provisions, refusing to engage with other
issues affecting the decision.V
Nicolson, writing before the adoption of the Constitution, warns that "[0 ]ne
should be careful not to assume that judicial formalism was simply an inevitable
function of the Westminster system of government and hence that a Bill of
Rights will automatically result in judicial activism.,,43 The new South African
era of constitutional supremacy brings with it new challenges to the judiciary to
redefine its role, rather than ready-made definitions of the judicial function.
40 Cameron 1989 (note 23 supra) 259, referring to Dugard Human Rights and the South African
Legal Order 1978
41 Dugard "The Judicial Process, Positivism and Civil Liberty" SAU 1971 (88) 181 at 184 gives
the reasons for the acceptance of positivism, which was "the predominant legal philosophy of
nineteenth century England," in South Africa, as "the decline of natural-law doctrine in Europe"
and "the pervasiveness of English legal influence." At 187 he criticises it as leading to "a
rejection of legal values ... which results in the repudiation of policy considerations in the
judicial process."
42 A recent example of such an approach may be found in the judgment of Flemming DJP in
Beta Eiendomme (Pty) Ltd v Ekple-Epoh 2000 (4) SA 468 par 6.2: "There are situations, often
novel factual situations, where the law can incline in one direction rather than the other. Policy
has really always been part of adjudicating. Any such opportunity or need is clearly
distinguishable from the present situation."
43 Nicolson 1992 (note 20 supra) 71
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Using the historical and theoretical framework examined in the preceding parts,
an analysis of the role of a judge in a constitutional state follows. A comparative
approach has been adopted, incorporating descriptions of the judicial role in
other constitutional jurisdictions, but the emphasis falls on how these sources
have influenced the South African judiciary, and the relevance of sources used
will be demonstrated in the light of South African cases, or the Constitution.
2 4 THE JUDICIAL ROLE IN A CONSTITUTIONAL STATE
The role of judges in South Africa is, as has been indicated already, determined
as much by historical factors as by the new Constitution. The historical analysis
in this chapter points to the reliance placed on traditional assumptions about
judicial independence, which is frequently equated with the ideal of a judge as
passive arbitrator, rather than active enquirer, as being concerned with law
rather than politics, and as upholding the public interests expressed in the law
ahead of particular or private interests.
The critique that follows in this part of the chapter also draws from history and
precedent, but maintains the view that, in a constitutional state, judicial
independence is not simply a function of a judge's degree of involvement in
controversial or political issues, but derives from the expression of
constitutional values and compliance with constitutional provisions by all
branches and organs of state. The attainment of this goal, in terms of which the
state represents and 'lives out' constitutional values, while promoting debate
about what this actually means, is a complex and difficult process. However, it
cannot be facilitated by drawing hasty conclusions about the role of judges in
order to secure a supposedly independent judiciary that does not soil its hands
with matters unrelated to its 'central mission' of adjudication, especially if those
matters are political rather than legal.
In analysing the seminal US case on separation of powers, Marbury v
Madison/" earlier American legal theorists frequently applauded the decision on
445 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). The specific issue in Marbury was judicial review of executive
conduct, the legitimacy of which was held to depend on whether the conduct was purely
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the grounds "that the law/ politics distinction was crucial to Marshall's great
achievement as Chief Justice: the establishment of the rule of law as the basis of
Supreme Court jurisprudence.v" More recently, however, the realisation has
grown that "value questions inhere in deciding which issues of separation of
powers or individual rights to remove from the sphere of democratic politics for
resolution by the courts. Therefore we need to qualify Marshall's assertion ...
that' [i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say
what the law is,.,,46 These shifts in opinion illustrate the previously denied
difficulties with which the courts are faced in carrying out their task of
upholding the Constitution and the law.
Constitutionalism entails more than just the rule of law, though this is one of its
elements.l As Davis points out, South African law was abruptly "required to
come to grips with the difficulties of constitutionalism and thereby to make
meaning of this new promise of unity.?" when the Constitution was adopted.
The new Constitution did indeed establish a new legal and social order in which
all citizens were granted the right to participate, but this new order is far from
the homogeneous nation postulated by theorists of the eighteenth century. This
is a reference to Habermas's observations on the problems of constitutionalism,
which relate to the dependence of traditional concepts of constitutional
democracy on the idea of a homogeneous nation state in which everyone has an
equal stake, which equal participation and political rights do not guarantee.
The difficulty of the judiciary's task is intimately connected with these
observations, and it is therefore unfortunate that the Constitutional Court should
attempt to link judicial independence with abstinence from the political domain,
at precisely the point in South Africa's history at which the courts have been
political (and thus unreviewable) or not. The Constitution of the RSA Act 108 of 1996 s167(5)
expressly grants the Constitutional Court final jurisdiction for judicial review of all legislation
and conduct of the President.
45 Haskins & Johnson, "Foundations of Power: John Marshall 1801-15" History of the Supreme
Court of the United States (1981) (2 ed), cited in Shane & Bruff Separation of Powers Law:
Cases and Materials (1996) 43
46 Shane & Bruff (note 45 supra) 43
47 Constitution (note 44 supra) sl(c)
48 Davis Democracy & Deliberation (1999) 7
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called upon to participate in the shaping of South Africa's political environment
through interpretation of a supremeConstitution.
In the Heath case, the Court rejects the argument of the court a quo that the
legal tradition of our country allowed judges to perform 'executive' functions,
such as presiding over commissions of inquiry, on the grounds that this
"tradition" comes from the pre-constitutional South African past, in which the
legislature was sovereign, and that "[w]hat is now permissible must be
determined in the light of our new Constitution, and not necessarily by past
practices.,,49
While this is on the surface a laudable attitude, the Court did not seem to
recognise that, if reinterpreted in the light of the Constitution, past practices
need not be discarded out of hand. A more encouraging stance in this respect
was adopted in Dodo, in which the Court refers to the pre-constitutional courts'
approach to the interpretation of legislation with a guarded approval. In S v
Toms; S v Bruce,50 the Appellate Division, at the time South Africa's highest
court, referring to the question of mandatory minimum sentences,
acknowledged that the legislature was perfectly competent to impose its
'sovereign will' on the courts. However, it then added that to do so, the
legislature would have to "express itself in clear and unmistakable terms...
Courts will not be astute to find that a mandatory sentence has been
prescribed. ,,51
This approach amounts to a form of 'dumb insolence', which the courts were at
that time obliged to use as a defence against the ruthlessness of parliamentary
sovereignty, if justice were to have any chance of prevailing. Of course, this
rather limited defence was not always sufficient to ensure a fair outcome, and is
wholly inappropriate to the radically different constitutional setting in which the
judiciary now operates. The Constitutional Court therefore concludes that, on
the issue of mandatory sentences, "little is to be gained from our pre-1994
49 Heath (note 1 supra) par 33
50 1990 (2) SA 802 (A), cited in Dodo (note 33 supra) par 18
51 807 cited in par 21
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jurisprudence.t'V although it also gives its assurance that "[n]o disagreement
with, or criticism of, Toms is implied."s3 Unfortunately, the Court was not
disposed to engage fully with the pre-constitutional position in which judges
operated, when it made its ruling on the judicial function in the Heath case.
The Heath judgment represented a return to a narrow conception of the
judiciary, as preferably occupied solely with adjudicative concerns. The Court
states that "judges who perform functions such as presiding over a commission
of inquiry, or sanctioning search warrants, may also become involved in
litigation. But that is an unwanted though possibly unavoidable incident of the
discharge of what are essentially judicial functions.v" from which the inference
is clearly that the Court not only acknowledges that judges are not always
confined to adjudication, but also allows that functions such as presiding over
commissions and sanctioning warrants are in fact judicial.
Despite this, the Court opmes: "By their very nature, such functions [as
recovering money for the state] are partisan.t'" a statement reflecting a great
deal of reluctance to make allowance for the new realities of the constitutional
state. In this new context, the functions mentioned above might become public
rather than partisan functions, aimed at rooting out corruption and restoring
constitutional values such as accountability, by a variety of meana"
It is also problematic to justify a certain type of 'unwanted' function, such as
judicial involvement in litigation, as constitutionally acceptable as long as it is
'unavoidable' and incidental to the accomplishment of judicial functions. If it
can be acceptable in some cases, when it is necessary for the performance of
judicial functions, then there should surely be a better reason not to condone it
in others than simply that it is undesirable. Moreover, this line of reasoning
misses the point that the activities described above are administrative functions
52 Dodo (note 33 supra) par 21
53 Par 21
54 Heath (note 1 supra) par 39
55 Par 40
56 See for example Constitution (note 44 supra) s182(1)(c) which grants the Public Protector, an
independent state institution supporting constitutional democracy, the power to "take
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more readily classified as extra-judicial and cannot seriously be described as
'essentially' or 'by their very nature' judicial.
The Court also relies on a dissenting judgment from an Australian case, in
support of its view that there is an "inextricable link between the SIU as
investigator and the SIU as litigator on behalf of the state.,,57 The Australian
judge declared:
"[I]t is not compatible with the holding of federal office in Australia
for such an office holder to become involved as 'part of the criminal
investigative process', closely engaged in work that may be
characterised as an adjunct to the investigatory and prosecutory
functions. Such activities ... could impermissibly merge the judiciary
and the other branches of government. The constitutional
prohibition is expressed so that the executive may not borrow a
federal judge to cloak actions proper to its own functions with the
'neutral colours of judicial action' ,,,58
The rationale for the Australian decision is evidently the ideal of the judge as
impartial adjudicator. Accepting this as the correct interpretation of the judicial
role, the Constitutional Court concludes that Heath's position as head of the
Special Investigating Unit is "incompatible with his judicial office and contrary
to the separation of powers required by our Constitution.t''" apparently
disregarding the possibility that "the state" on behalf of which Heath was
required to litigate might, under this new Constitution, mean something more
than the executive.
It is furthermore not at all clear that a provision like the prohibition referred to
in the judgment exists in our Constitution; certainly the Court does not refer to
appropriate remedial action" on discovering any improper conduct in state affairs or the public
administration.
57 Heath (note 1 supra) par 45
58 Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Straight Islander Affairs (1996) 189 CLR 1 44-5




one here, but impliedly supports the contention that judicial action is politically
neutral. Compare this with Davis's argument that the constitutional enterprise in
which judges are involved entails a form of politics and is not necessarily
neutral:
"The judiciary is therefore part of the political arena of society. By
virtue of the fact that it is engaged in the meaning of a text, the
nature of this form of politics is, of course, very different from that
carried out elsewhere in society. But while texts constrain, they do
not determine mechanistically. The interpretation of a constitutional
provision and the further act of application to a set of facts is the
outcome of argument, of competing or differing political projects or
visions, of the influence and impact of contending ideological
argument. ,,60
2 5 CONCLUSION
The difficulties of clearly defining the judicial role in a constitutional state,
though not exhaustively dealt with in this chapter, have been placed in their
historical and comparative theoretical context. The course of development in
the judicial function has been traced from Enlightenment theorists, through
the propagation of their ideas to colonies such as South Africa which, like
many other countries, has adopted a Constitution in which these theories are
expressed. In this part of the chapter, the Court's initial view of the role and
functions of judges, as discussed above, is compared with some more recent
conceptions of the constitutionally mandated role of the judiciary.
The influence of the separation of powers doctrine on the Constitutional Court's
understanding of the role of judges, and the lack of uniformity in the Court's
approach to foreign precedents in its analysis of the doctrine, have been brought
to light. However, the somewhat arbitrary approach in Heath, in which US and
Australian tests were employed for the purpose of circumscribing the role of the
60 Davis (note 48 supra) 14
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judiciary." has been moderated quite substantially by the more recent decisions
of Dodo and Mamabolo.62
A fine illustration of Kriegler J's comment that "[c]omparative study is always
useful, particularly where courts in exemplary jurisdictions have grappled with
universal issues confronting us ... But that is a far cry from blithe adoption of
alien concepts or inappropriate precedents'P' is found in the Court's citation of
Prof Laurence H Tribe in Dodo.64 Tribe's remarks advocate a close reading of
the constitutional text, in which the constitutionally mandated judicial role and
legitimate functions as expressed in the text are given priority. This prevents the
courts from attempting to introduce tests drawn from foreign jurisdictions,
unless the constitutional texts there are sufficiently similar. Needless to say, the
text is not exhaustive of the judicial function. However, it does expressly grant
the courts authoritative responsibility for the adjudication of legal disputes, and
the interpretation of law. 65
Other functions assigned to judges in terms of the Constitution, such as service
on the Judicial Service Commission and similar duties, indicate that the role of
the judiciary is more extensive now that judges enjoy a constitutionally
guaranteed independent status, and are sworn to "uphold and protect the
Constitution and the human rights entrenched in it, and [to] administer justice to
all persons alike without fear, favour or prejudice, in accordance with the
Constitution and the law.,,66The judiciary is, like all state institutions, primarily
bound to defend the supremacy of the Constitution.f"
Though still appointed by the executive, the judiciary is now accountable only
to the Judicial Service Commission under the Constitution, which prescribes
61 This approach calls to mind the comment of Kriegler J, in Bernstein v Bester NO 1996 (2) SA
751 (CC) par 133, that "far too often one sees citation by counsel of, for instance, an American
judgment in support of a proposition relating to our constitution, without any attempt to explain
why it is said to be in point."
62 Notes 18 and 37 supra respectively. See chapter 3 infra for Kriegler J's reasons for rejecting
the importation of an American test in this case.
63 Bernstein v Bester NO (note 61 supra) par 133
64 Note 33 supra par 17
65 Constitution (note 44 supra) s165
66 Schedule 2 Item 6
67 s41, and in particular ss( 1)(d) and (e), sets out the duties of other state organs in this regard.
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strict measures for the removal of judges in order to keep the judicial branch
independent of the other branches of government. This facilitates the
constitutional review task of the courts, which playa vital role in ensuring that
the Constitution is respected and protected.
In the remammg chapters of this thesis, an analysis of the judicial role,
compared with the function of other institutions supporting constitutional
democracy, is performed, and the meaning of judicial independence is examined
in the light of the recent cases dealing with the separation of powers.
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CHAPTER 3: THE INTERPRETATION OF AN IMPLIED CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISION
3 1 INTRODUCTION
In 1993, for the first time in South Africa, a supreme Constitution was adopted.'
Although this was an interim Constitution, the first of two stages in South
Africa's constitution-making process, it represented a radical shift from the
previous dispensation that has had far-reaching implications for the way in
which the role of judges is understood. These developments in the judicial role
have been sustained and continued in the subsequent implementation of the
1996 Constitution.2 An important effect of the unusual two-stage process
followed in the adoption of South Africa's Constitution, was the involvement of
the Constitutional Court, established by the interim Constitution, in the
validation of the final constitutional text.
As Basson points out, "it is clear that the interim Constitution grves
considerable weight to the provisions which deal with the Constitutional
Principles and the fact that the Constitutional Court must certify that the new
constitutional text complies with these principles." However, apart from its
connection with this unprecedented judicial responsibility, the new
constitutional text has affected the way judges interpret 'the law' in its most
general and all-encompassing sense. The Constitution forms a basis for our law,
and thus influences the judicial decision-making process. It contains provisions
relating to its application, both directly and as affecting legal interpretation."
Moreover, being itself a law, the Constitution requires interpretation and also
gives directives relating to its own interpretation.'
According to the Constitution, "[t]he Constitutional Court is the highest court in
all constitutional matters.?" This adds the weight of constitutional authority to
the interpretations of the Court, although the Court is also influenced by other
IConstitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993
2 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 108 of 1996
3 Basson South Africa's Interim Constitution: text and notes (1995) 104
4 Especially s8, the 'application clause', and s39, the 'interpretation clause'.
5 For instance s39(1) gives directives relating to the bill of rights.
6 sI67(3)(a). 'Constitutional matters' must include questions of interpretation.
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interpreters of the Constitution, such as legal academics and the lower courts, to
whom this authority is not given. It should be noted that the creation of a
separate court to deal with constitutional matters was a subject of contention
during the drafting of the Constitution.' Proponents of a specialist constitutional
court based their arguments primarily on the need to establish a new court with
a clean interpretive record, since the existing courts were experiencing a
legitimacy crisis that had resulted from their traditional formalist approach and
implicit support of the executive.f
In this chapter, the development of the Court's interpretive approach to the
constitutional provision made for a separation of powers between branches of
government, is considered. This development is traced through the sequence of
cases dealing with the question of separation of powers and how it affects the
definition of the judicial function. The Court has expressed its desire to retain a
flexible approach to the doctrine, without presuming to pre-empt the issue of
'whatever the outer boundaries of separation of powers are eventually
determined to be.,,9 This flexibility in applying the doctrine is ascribed to the
Court's interpretive approach in the Certification case," in which it was dealing
with the compliance of the final constitutional text with the Constitutional
Principles, rather than constitutional provisions as such.
More importantly, it is submitted that the outcomes of Constitutional Court
cases such as those considered in the next chapter, namely Heath/1 Dodo/2
Mamabolo13 and the Certification case," depend to a considerable extent on the
7 Forsyth "Interpreting a Bill of Rights: the future task ofa reformed judiciary?" SAJHR 1991
(7) 1 questions the desirability of a specialist Constitutional Court.
8 Du Plessis & Corder Understanding South Africa's Transitional Bill of Rights (1994) 191 "The
law and the courts had been undermined by the consistent use of them as instruments of
domination to work injustice, thus creating a crisis of legitimacy in the legal system as a whole."
See also Dugard 'The Judicial Process, Positivism and Civil Liberty" SALf 1971 (88) 200
"Adherence to legal positivism has reduced the legal profession to the status of a technical trade
in the eyes of the public."
9 De Lange v Smuts NO 1998 (7) BCLR 779 (CC) par 61
10 Par 60 refers to this aspect of Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re:
Certification of the Constitution of the RSA, 19961996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC).
Il South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath and Others 2001 (1) BCLR 77
(CC)
12 S v Dodo 2001 (5) BCLR 423 (CC)
13 S v Mamabo 2001 (5) BCLR 449 (CC)
14 Note 10 supra
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approach adopted. This is primarily because the doctrine of separation of
powers does not have a universal meaning, and the courts are reluctant to limit
the development of South African separation of powers jurisprudence by
defining its implications in narrow terms.15
The Certification case is atypical, in the sense that it does not involve
constitutional interpretation as we might usually expect, but rather an evaluation
or weighing up of the constitutional text as subject to the Constitutional
Principles agreed on by the Constitutional Assernbly.l" However, this process
still demands that the text be interpreted before it can be tested against the
principles, and that the principles also be interpreted. For this reason, the
approach of the Court to the interpretation of the Constitutional Principles
themselves, which in this case functioned as the authoritative text, is also
considered.
One of these principles, Constitutional Principle VI, explicitly requires a
horizontal separation of powers between three branches of government, and an
accompanying system of checks and balances. The fact that these requirements
are incorporated into a single principle, suggests that they should be seen as
complementary, while the inclusion of a system of checks and balances suggests
that adherence to the pure doctrine of separation of powers is not required. The
principle also aims at achieving a particular goal, which is "to ensure
accountability, responsiveness and openness.t''" It is worth noting that,
although there is no specific reference to the principle of separation of powers in
the text of the final Constitution, the purpose of Constitutional Principle VI is
expressed in the section 1 founding values, one group of which is aimed at
securing precisely those three characteristics - namely accountability,
responsiveness and openness in government. 18
15 De Lange v Smuts (note 9 supra) par 61; SAAPIL v Heath (note Il supra) par 31;
Certification case (note 10 supra) par 108, 113
16 This process was a requirement ofs71 of the interim Constitution (note 1 supra).
17 Constitutional Principle VI Certification case (note 10 supra) 1402 Annexure 2
18 Constitution of the RSA (note 2 supra) sl(d) "The RSA is one sovereign, democratic state
founded on the following values: Universal adult suffrage, a national common voters roll,
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The importance of the interpretive method followed by the courts is explained
by Botha, in his 1994 paper on constitutional interpretation, in the assertion that
"the legitimacy, and therefore the ultimate success of the new constitutional
order will, to a great extent, hinge on the interpretation and application of the
Constitution by the judiciary: the people must feel that the Constitution is
working for them" (Botha's emphasisj.I" This also applies to the method of the
courts in interpreting the principle of separation of powers.
3 2 THE COURT'S ,ApPROACH IN THE CASE LAW
3 2 1 Bernstein v Bester NO
The Constitutional Court's first mention of the principle of separation of
powers, as it affects the extent of the judicial power, was made in Bernstein v
Bester NO,20 in which the constitutionality of s417 and 418 of the Companies
Act21was challenged under the interim Constitution.r' These sections authorised
a commissioner appointed by the liquidators of a company to summon the
auditors of the company under liquidation to appear before himlher and produce
certain documentation. The reference to separation of powers occurs in the
context of the challenge based on "the implied right to fairness in civil
litigation,,,23 which was drawn from a particular reading of s22 and 7(4)(a) of
the Constitution.24
The Court addresses the question of whether the norm that civil procedure ought
to aim at fairness between the contending parties is enacted by the Constitution
as an entrenched right, and comes to the conclusion that our courts "have
consistently adopted the view that words cannot be read into a statute by
regular elections and a multi-party system of democratic government, to ensure accountability,
responsiveness and openness."
19 Botha "Interpretation of the Constitution" 1994 SA Publiclaw 257-264259
201996 (4) BCLR449 (CC)
21 Act 61 of 1973
22 Note 1 supra. It is worth noting at this point that separation of powers, as laid out in
Constitutional Principle VI, was included in a schedule of the interim Constitution and therefore
had the force of law at the time of this judgment.
23 Bernstein v Bester NO (note 20 supra) par 102
24 Note 1 supra s7(4)(a) sets out the locus standi requirement, while s22 states: "Every person
shall have the right to have justiciable disputes settled by a court of law or, where appropriate,
another independent and impartial forum."
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implication unless the implication is a necessary one in the sense that without it
effect cannot be given to the statute as it stands.,,25Whether the implication is a
necessary one is determined by asking if it is necessary in order "to realise the
ostensible legislative intention or to make the Act workable" (my emphasisj.f
The Court's approach to the reading of an implied constitutional provision is
thus directly adopted from the approach of the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court to the reading of implied statutory provisions. The provisions in
question were then read in the context of the interim Constitution as a whole,
and found "to be workable and to realise the ostensible legislative intention,
without the implication the appellants [sought] to rely upon.,,27 The Court then
adds that, if s22 is read with s96(2), which provides that "[t]he judiciary shall be
independent, impartial, and subject only to the Constitution and the law," its
purpose may clearly be seen as the emphasis and protection, "generally, but also
specifically for the individual, [of] the separation of powers, particularly the
separation of the judiciary from the other arms of the State. ,,28
The section is then linked to the upholding of the rule of law, and the prevention
of legislatures from turning themselves into "courts".29 However, the challenge
is finally dismissed on the grounds that the complaint raised on the basis of this
s22 is really an equality issue, which should be dealt with in terms of the right to
equality.l'' Nonetheless, the Court speculates, without deciding on the issue, that
the implied provision could be rejected using the argument that "the framers
deliberately elected not to constitutionalise the right to a fair civil trial.,,31
This reference to the framers' intention, though obiter, ralses a number of
difficult questions about the identity and authority of the framers,32 not only
25 Par 105. This strict test is drawn from Rennie NO v Gordon NNO 1988 (1) SA 1 (A) 21E.
26 Palvie v Motale Bus Service (Pty) Ltd 1993 (4) SA 742 (A) 749C
27 Bernstein v Bester NO (note 20 supra) par 105
28 Par 105
29 Par 105, in which the example given is the High Court of Parliament Act challenged in
Minister of the Interior v Harris 1952 (4) SA 769 (A). See also the discussion on the
law/politics distinction at 2 2 in chapter 2 supra.
30 Interim Constitution (note 1 supra) s8
31 Bernstein v Bester NO (note 20 supra) par 106
32 Most of the drafting of the interim Constitution was done by technical committees, and it was
finally approved in 1993 by members of the Multi-Party Negotiating Process, the structure of
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because of the legitimacy problems of the parties involved.r' but because the
negotiating process through which the interim Constitution came into being was
not conducive to the formation of collective intentions of the kind postulated
here.34
The situation under the final Constitution, which underwent both political and
judicial scrutiny before it became a valid enactment, might be far more
complex. It is thus understandable that a resort to the framers' intention is
deliberately avoided by the Court in Heath,35 in which an implied provision is
decisive in the judgment, and applied without the assistance of either of the tests
mentioned above.36
3 2 2 In re: Certification of the Constitution of the RSA
The unusual interpretive approach of the Constitutional Court in the
Certification case37 is, as is to be expected, largely dictated by the unique
context within which it finds itself operating. It describes its task, the "judicial
certification of a Constitution", as unprecedented, and distinguishes between the
formal purpose and underlying purpose of the exercise." The formal aspect is
dealt with simply by stating that the Court must pronounce judgment on whether
or not the provisions of the proposed new South African Constitution comply
with the Constitutional Principles contained in the interim Constitution.i" The
question of the underlying purpose is tackled by placing the process within its
which is described by Eloff in De Villiers (ed) Birth of a Constitution "The Process of Giving
Birth" 14-19.
33 The chief role-players were members of the 3-chamber parliament, homeland governments,
and other parties, the support of none of which "had ever been tested during fully democratic
elections." Basson (note 3 supra) xxi.
34 Note De Villiers description in "The Constitutional Principles: Content and Significance"
(note 32 supra) 39 of the outcome of 'headline negotiations', which "gave the impression of
consensus, which actually was not the case at all. The slightest attempt to interpret and explain
the agreements and consensus led to conflict and contradictory statements."
35 Note 11 supra
36 See also note 76 infra
37 Note 10 supra




historical, political and legal context and by explaining the extent and
limitations of the court's powers as reflected in this process.Ï''
In summary, these powers have two main features. They extend beyond the
answering of challenges to the Constitution brought to the attention of the Court
by a variety of interested parties, and include the whole text. On the other hand,
they are limited to abstract review of the constitutional provisions in question,
so as not to pre-empt concrete disputes which may arise before the Court at a
future date." In this process of abstract review of the whole constitutional text,
the Court follows a liberal approach to interpreting the Constitutional Principles,
declaring that they "must not be interpreted with technical rigidity',.42 Implicit
in such an approach is a desire to certify the text as complying with the
Constitutional Principles wherever this might be possible. This amounts to a
presumption of compliance, which is evident in many parts of the judgment.
An example from the section dealing with central government issues is the
pronouncement that the provision made in the Constitution for separation of
powers between the legislature and executive (which is not an absolute
separation) complies with the Constitutional Principle that requires such
separation because "the language of [the Constitutional Principle] is sufficiently
wide to cover the type of separation required by the new text.'.43 In other words,
since the Constitution may be construed as including the principle of separation
of powers, the extent of this separation becomes irrelevant for the purposes of
certification.
A similar argument is used to dismiss challenges to the Judicial Service
Commission (JSC) and its composition. The Court points out that, because the
Constitutional Principles dealing with the appointment of judges only set criteria
according to which judges should be selected without prescribing any particular







that the JSC "could have been constituted differently, with greater
representation being given to the legal profession and the judiciary.T'"
The JSC is simply the chosen method for constitutionally guaranteeing that
these criteria will be met, and the Court "cannot interfere with that decision.'.45
More specifically, the Court recognises the limitations inherent in the
Constitutional Principles, and that these will have to be supplemented by the
text. The constitutional text is meant to give particular expression to a general
principle specified in the Constitutional Principles. Where there are various
ways of giving expression to a particular principle, the text can adopt only one,
and the Court does not need to concern itself with the alternatives and whether
any of these may be better, but must be satisfied that the chosen alternative does
indeed constitute a form of that general principle.
As the Court declares, in its analysis of Constitutional Principle VI: "There is,
however, no universal model of separation of powers, and in democratic
systems of government in which checks and balances result in the imposition of
restraints by one branch of government upon another, there is no separation that
is absolute.?" It proceeds to consider a number of other democratic states in
which there is said to be a separation of powers, and accepts that membership of
more than one branch of state, especially the legislature and executive branches,
is common. It is also acceptable, provided that there is "functional
independence" of the branches of government, which "prevents the branches
from usurping power from one another.T'"
In its comments on the significance of the Constitutional Principle for the
judiciary, the Court states: "What is crucial to the separation of powers and the
independence of the judiciary is that the judiciary should enforce the law
44 Par 124
45 Par 124. Presumably the Court would interfere if the criteria, also expressed in s174(1) of the





impartially and that it should function independently of the legislature and the
executive. ,,48
Using this comparative approach to the theory of separation of powers, the
Court comes to the conclusion that the imperfect separation can be seen as
fulfilling the further requirement, also contained in Constitutional Principle VI,
of checks and balances, since it allows for both "independence and
interdependence of government branches. ,,49 Although the Court does not
expressly refer to the demise of parliamentary sovereignty here, it does mention
our history of legislative and executive dominance earlier in the judgment, 50and
it is within this context that this observation is made. Finally, the Court indicates
that "the model adopted reflects the historical circumstances of our
constitutional development. ,,51
3 2 3 De Lange v Smuts NO
Separation of powers was raised in De Lange v Smuts Nd2 as part of the
challenge to s66(3) of the Insolvency Act,53 which dealt with the powers of the
presiding officer at a creditors' meeting to issue a warrant committing an
uncooperative witness to prison. This would include anyone who refuses to be
sworn, refuses to answer any question lawfully put to himlher, or fails to answer
any question fully or satisfactorily. It was argued that this provision infringed
the principle of separation of powers, by granting someone who was not a
judicial officer, or not exercising a judicial function, the power to commit a
person to prison until he/she agreed to cooperate.
The Constitutional Court delivered five separate judgments, and for the
purposes of this chapter, only the separation of powers related aspects of each
judgment, according to the degree in which they rely on the doctrine, will be





52 Note 9 supra
53 Act 24 of 1936
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considered. The main points of disagreement among the members of the Court
concerned whether or not the impugned section was completely constitutional,
not constitutional at all, or constitutional only if the presiding officer was a
magistrate.
Ackermann J relied partly but not exclusively on separation of powers in
reaching the latter conclusion. On the status of the separation of powers
principle in the Constitution, 54he states only that the Constitution provides for
separation of powers "pursuant to Constitutional Principle VI,,,55 and refers to
the statement of the Court in the Certification case56 that "[t]here is ... no
universal model of separation of powers.,,57 He opines that, "over time, our
courts will develop a distinctively South African model of separation of powers,
one that fits the particular system of government provided for by the
Constitution and that reflects a delicate balancing, informed by both South
Africa's history and its new dispensation, between the need, on the one hand, to
control government by separating powers and enforcing checks and balances,
and, on the other, to avoid diffusing power so completely that the government is
unable to take timely measures in the public interest.,,58
This is similar to the abstract review method used by the Court in the
Certification case, although it also emphasises the need to examine the doctrine
in the context of the specific provisions of the Constitution and the historical
context of South Africa. As in the Certification case, there is a marked
reluctance to engage with the practical questions of how this 'delicate
balancing' may be accomplished, beyond declaring that this "complex matter"
will be "developed more fully as cases involving separation of powers issues are
decided. ,,59
The conclusion drawn by Ackermann J is that the power to commit a
recalcitrant witness to prison "is within the very heartland of the judicial power
54 Note 1 supra
55 De Lange v Smuts NO (note 9 supra) par 60
56 Note 10 supra




and therefore cannot be exercised by non-judicial officers,,,6o and for additional
support he refers to similar pronouncements made by US courts. The capacity in
which the judicial officer performs the function, namely as presiding officer at a
creditors' meeting, does not apparently detract from the fact that it is the
prerogative of judicial officers to exercise such powers.
Sachs J concurs with the conclusion drawn by Ackermann J, but uses only the
separation of powers principle as his justification." He interprets the act of
sending an unco-operative witness to prison as a judicial act, forming "a crucial
part of the authority reserved in democratic states to the judiciary''t' For this
reason, he declares: "The doctrine of separation of powers prevents Parliament
from entrusting such authority to persons who are not judicial officers
performing court functions as contemplated by sI65(1) [of the Constitutionj.t'f
He then interprets sI65(1), which vests judicial authority in "the courts" as
including members of the courts, even while not presiding over the institution of
a court, because "[u]nlike other appointees, magistrates exercising powers of
committal to prison under s66(3) of the Insolvency Act will enjoy institutional
independence and can be expected to apply the law impartially and without fear,
favour or prejudice.?" Independence is thus seen as attaching to the person of a
judicial officer, rather than the court as an institution.
In finding that the provision is wholly unconstitutional, Mokgoro J does not
refer explicitly to separation of powers, but disagrees strongly with Ackermann
and Sachs 11 that the fact that the person committing the witness to prison is a
judicial officer is an adequate safeguard of individual liberty." She states that










"due to the presence of the judicial officers, but because of the rule of law which
is upheld there.,,66
O'Regan J comes to the same conclusion, on the grounds that a magistrate
presiding at a creditors' meeting is not performing a judicial function, but acts in
an administrative capacity and is therefore not authorised to exercise the judicial
power of committing a person to prison/"
The judgment of Didcott J opposes the view that "sending people to jail should
always be the function of the judiciary alone," and concludes that the contested
section is not unconstitutional." He refers to the fact that "[t]he separation
between the executive and the judiciary is not total in South Africa,,,69 and that
magistrates are called upon to perform a number of administrative tasks falling
within the domain of the executive, and "moving readily and frequently from
the bench to the bureaucracy and back.,,70
He goes on to note that, whether the presiding officer at a creditors' meeting is a
magistrate or not, he/she is likely to be independent and impartial, with "no
interest to promote or protect in that area.,,7l The imprisoned party is also fully
entitled to appeal immediately to the High Court, thus allowing the judiciary to
intervene and decide substantively on the merit of the committal.
What is most striking in De Lange v Smuts NO, is the lack of agreement among
members of the Court, not only about the extent of the judicial function, and
what acts are included in it, but also about how the separation of powers
principle should be interpreted. Each judgment shifts the emphasis to a different
66 Par 137. Mokgoro J summarises her position by quoting Lord Acton that "[t]here is no worse
heresy than that the office sanctifies the holder of it."
67 Par 160. O'Regan quotes Le Dain J in Valente v The Queen (1985) 24 DLR (4th) 161 at 171:
"[A]n individual judge may enjoy the essential conditions of judicial independence but if the
court or tribunal over which he or she presides is not independent of the other branches of








aspect of the doctrine, the meaning of judicial independence, and the meaning of
the provision granting judicial authority to the COurtS.72
3 2 4 South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath
The Constitutional Court's decision in Heath73 is interesting for a number of
reasons, and deals with a more complex set of facts and legal issues than the
later cases of S v Dodo or S v Mamabolo. 74 For one, it is a unanimous decision
of the Court (per Chaskalson P) on the question of separation of powers, which
puts to rest many of the differing opinions on the judicial function expressed in
De Lange v Smuts NO.75 In the context of constitutional interpretation, it is
particularly significant in that it pronounces finally on the status of "implied" or
"implicit" constitutional terms.
Using a reference to the contract law distinction between tacit and implied
terms, the Court elects to call such terms 'implicit' or 'implied by law', since
the designation "tacit" would suggest that these terms were intended by the
drafters but never expressed in writing. To accept such a proposition as valid
grounds for adopting a constitutional provision, the Court explains, might be
seen as "endorsing the doctrine of original intent," a controversial interpretive
approach which our Constitutional Court claims never to have adopted." The
Court then declares that implicit constitutional provisions have the same force
as express provisions, on the authority of the Fedsure case,77 in which
legislation conflicting with the legality principle implicit in the interim
Constitution was held to be invalid.Ï''
72 Constitution (note 1 supra) s165
73 Note 11 supra
74 Note 12 and 13 supra
75 Note 9 supra
76 Par 19. However, in Bernstein v Bester NO (note 20 supra) the Court made an obiter
statement to the effect that "[t]he Constitution as a whole and section 22 in particular, appears to
be workable and to realise the ostensible legislative intention" par 105. The 'ostensible
legislative intention' differs from 'legislative intention' in that it refers not to the actual intention
of the legislature, but only the intention as demonstrated in, or apparent from the text.
77 Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd and Others v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan
Council and Others 1998 (12) BCLR 1458 (CC)
78 Heath (note 11 supra) par 20
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Next, the Court embarks on a comparative exercise in which it determines that
the South African Constitution is not alone in containing no express term
incorporating the doctrine of separation of powers, but that the USA and
Australia also provide for separation of powers only implicitly, by vesting state
powers in three separate branches of state.79 The obvious reason for this is the
one stated by the Court in the Certification case, which is that a reference to the
doctrine of separation of powers could mean a wide variety of different things,
and does not embody a universal rule or principle.t"
It is therefore unhelpful to examine the separation of powers doctrine either in
the abstract, as a theory, or as it is practically applied in other democratic states,
and difficult to ensure that "laws inconsistent with what the Constitution
requires" with respect to such separation are declared invalid, without having
recourse to the text itself.81 To overcome this difficulty, the Court compensates
by using the term "separation" to mean "independence", as is evident in
statements such as: "The separation of the judiciary from the other branches of
government is an important aspect of the separation of powers required by the
Constitution, and is essential to the role of the courts under the Constitution"
(my emphasisj.V
The consequences of this decision will be explored at more length in chapter 5
of this thesis; suffice it to say for now that the immediate result was that the
Court did not examine the necessity of judicial independence primarily with
reference to our Constitution, in which this requirement is expressly contained."
Continuing in an exploratory vein, the Court begins to consider the possible
circumstances in which the performance of extra-judicial functions by judges
might infringe the separation of powers doctrine. To do so, the Court is led to
consider the kinds of assignment that judges in other jurisdictions might not be
79 South Africa's interim Constitution (Act 200 of 1993) was an exception in this regard, as it
incorporated the Constitutional Principles into a schedule which has the same force as the rest of
the provisions in the text, one of which, Constitutional Principle VI, expressly referred to
separation of powers.
80 Note 10 supra par 108: "There is, however, no universal model of separation of powers."
81 Heath (note 11 supra) par 22 suggests that we should attempt this.
82 Par 25. It is submitted that the Court is also using 'required by' to mean 'implicit in', although
if 'independence' were substituted for 'separation', 'required by' would be justified by s165(2).
83 The Court does refer in passing to s165(2), at par 26 of the judgment.
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allowed to accept, and these guidelines are refined to a few core tests for which
of these activities would pass constitutional muster."
However, there is an understandable reluctance on the part of the Court to
incorporate these tests wholesale into our law, and instead, the Court declares
that the decision rests finally with the Court itself. 85 The Court does not at any
stage examine the text of the Constitution very closely in making this decision,
and it is therefore not clear that a particular interpretive approach is being
implemented. Moreover, comments such as "They [ie. the functions performed
by the SIU] are inconsistent with judicial functions as ordinarily understood in
South Africa," suggest an intuitive or 'common sense' approach to the decision,
informed by the Court's 'ordinary understanding' of the judicial function, rather
that by engagement with what the supreme Constitution prescribes or expresses.
325 SvDodo
In Dodo's case." the issue at stake is whether mandatory minimum sentences
prescribed by the legislature are constitutionally acceptable. In deciding this,
the Court looks, on the one hand, at the interpretation of a Bill of Rights
provision, namely the "fair trial" right as set out in s35,87 and on the other at the
question of separation of powers, and how to interpret this doctrine correctly in
the light of our Constitution. It is this second enquiry which demands the
majority of our attention in this chapter.
The court a quo relied on previous analyses of the separation of powers
principle, as developed by the Constitutional Court in the Certification case,"
Bernstein v Bester,89 De Lange v Smut/o and especially Heath,91 to justify its
84 Par 29
85 Par 31. It should, however, be noted that the reasons given for striking down the relevant
legislation were lifted directly from these tests - see for example par 45, in which the Court
holds that the functions of the head of the SIU are "far removed from 'the central mission of the
{udiciary' ."
6 Note 12 supra
87 Constitution (note 6 supra)
88 Note 10 supra
89 Note 20 supra
90 Note 9 supra
91 Note 11 supra
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decision that sentencing "falls within the heartland of the judicial power, and is
not to be usurped by the legislature,,,92 and that mandatory minimum sentences
are not constitutionally acceptable. However, the Constitutional Court adopts a
rather different approach, having recourse to the constitutional text itself and the
recognition in that text of legislative involvement in the sentencing process.
The rights of accused persons include the right "to the benefit of the least severe
of the prescribed punishments if the prescribed punishment for the offence has
been changed between the time that the offence was committed and the time of
sentencing. ,,93
This not only fits the old maxim nulla poena sine lege,94but also gives effect to
the view that prescribed sentences send a message to the would-be criminal
about the consequences of a particular crime, which may serve as a deterrent
measure; and if this message is altered, the person should be allowed to hold the
legislature to the original 'bargain'. 95
This way of reading s35(3)(n) undermines the separation of powers argument
used in the court a quo, which denies or at least downplays the contribution of
the legislature to the sentencing process. The Constitutional Court distinguishes
between two aspects of sentencing, namely the prescription of a general
principle for sentencing, and the individualising of that principle in a particular
case." The former is the function of the legislature, which "cannot provide for
each individually determined case," while the power to determine the particular
outcome of the general principle is left to the courts.
This interdependence accords with the need for checks and balances within the
framework of a state based on constitutional supremacy, and the Constitution is
the ultimate decider of how any general legislative principle should be applied
to an individual or group. In the legislation in question, the court was not turned
92 Dodo (note 12 supra) par 8. This amounts to the test used in Heath's case to determine
whether the principle of separation of powers had been violated.
93 Constitution (note 6 supra) s35(3)(n), quoted in Dodo (note 12 supra) par 25
94 "No punishment without a law", an expression of the legality principle in criminal law.
95 Of course, this assumes that the criminal has investigated which sentence is likely to be
£assed, or that the punishment in question has been well-publicised and is common knowledge.
6 Dodo (note 12 supra) par 26
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into a "rubber stamp" for the legislature, with no discretion as to sentence
whatsoever.Y The discretion allowed is confined to situations where
"substantial and compelling circumstances" dictate that the mandatory
minimum sentence should not be imposed."
In accordance with s39(2) of the Constitution, the Court must interpret this
legislative test in the context of the need "to promote the spirit, purport and
objects of the Bill of Rights.,,99 Although it does not expressly refer to this
provision, it nevertheless endorses the interpretive approach prescribed here,
commonly known as "reading down", where it examines the question of
whether the High Court is compelled, in terms of the legislation, "to pass a
sentence which is inconsistent with the accused's right ... 'not to be punished in
a cruel, inhuman or degrading way' ,,,100and comes to the conclusion that the
legislation "does not, on its proper construction, transgress the Bill of Rights
check on the legislature, and therefore does not infringe the separation of
powers principle either" (my emphasisj.i'"
The reason for my emphasis in the preceding paragraph is to highlight the
complementary practices of using the interpretive method of 'reading down',
aimed at promoting the Bill of Rights, and the incorporation of the Bill of
Rights guarantees into a theory of checks and balances, in which the Bill of
Rights constitutes "a most important check on the legislature.,,102 The 'gross
proportionality' tests from foreign jurisdictions, and other accessories, are in
tum employed in terms of s39(1) of the Constitution, which deals with Bill of
Rights interpretation, in order to determine what constitutes an infringement of
s12(e), and reach the same conclusion supported by 'reading down' the
legislative provisions.
97 Par 20, in which S v Toms: S v Bruce 1990 (2) SA 802 (A) is differentiated from the situation
encountered here.
98 Par 10
99 Note 1 supra





In summary, a court should interpret the requirement of "substantial and
compelling circumstances" so as to give effect to the spirit, purport and objects
of the Bill of Rights prescription that no one should be "punished in a cruel,
inhuman or degrading way.,,103 At the same time it should implement the
appropriate tests as to what might make the punishment in question 'cruel,
inhuman or degrading,' so as to fulfil its role as a check on the legislature. This
has the unusual effect of incorporating the separation of powers doctrine,
together with checks and balances, as expressed in Constitutional Principle VI,
into an interpretive approach based on s39.
3 2 6 S v Mamabolo
The case of S v Mamabolol04 is of particular interest as a Constitutional Court
case, in that it deals with the constitutionally permissible limits on criticism of
judges and their decisions. For the judges concerned, this is clearly very close to
having to rule on their own interests, and the decision must at one time or
another affect their own position. This is not to say that the Court had a direct
interest in the case on its facts, but it will certainly experience the repercussions
of what was decided here.
The question of constitutional interpretation was addressed primarily in the
context of the Bill of Rights, and whether the criticism at issue here was
protected by the right to freedom of expression, lOS as well as whether the
'contempt of court' summary proceedings used by courts complied with the fair
trial rights set out in s35 of the Constitution. However, the Court also paid some
attention to s165 of the Constitution, which obliges all organs of state "to assist
and protect the courts to ensure the independence, impartiality, dignity,
accessibility, and effectiveness of the courtS.,,106
It is the interpretive approach to this provision which forms the main subject of
the analysis in this chapter. Some comments are also made on the way in which
103 Constitution (note 6 supra) sI2(e)
104 Note 13 supra.




the Court interprets the separation of powers doctrine as implied within our
constitutional order, because the view that the Court adopts with regard to the
position of the judiciary in terms of this doctrine affects its understanding of
s165.
As in the Certification case, the Court's point of departure in interpreting this
obligation to protect the judiciary, and the need for a separation of powers, is
rooted in the history of South Africa. The Court asserts that this opening section
of the chapter dealing with the courts and the administration of justice, indicates
a recognition of "the vulnerability of the judiciary and the importance of
enhancing and protecting its moral authority.,,107 The clear implication is that
these have been low priorities in the past, and this constitutional provision may
help to remedy the situation, if upheld and applied correctly.
The Court interprets the obligation imposed on state organs in sI65(4) as
emphatically broad, given the "compendious meaning" assigned to the term
"organ of state" in s239 of the Constitution.l'" and proceeds to use these insights
to explain the peculiar position of the courts, and the reasons for some of their
practices, including the need for public proceedings and a right of appeal to a
higher court.
In Mamabolo's case the Court clearly uses the separation of powers doctrine in
a very specific way. The context dictates that the doctrine must be applied, not
to protect the independence of the courts, nor to preserve certain functions for
the judiciary alone, nor even to defend other branches of state from interference
by the courts, but instead for the less traditional purpose of ensuring the
'dignity' and 'effectiveness' of the courts, to quote just two of the aims of
sI65(4).
107 Mamabo (note 13 supra) par 17
108 Note 6 supra. The definition of "organ of state" is given as "(a) any department of state or
administration in the national or provincial or local sphere of government; or (b) any other
functionary or institution - (i) exercising a public power or performing a function in terms of the
Constitution or a provincial constitution; or (ii) exercising a public power or performing a public
function in terms of any legislation, but does not include a court or a judicial officer."
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This implies a recognition on the part of the Court that there is no real need to
toy with or speculate about the meaning of the separation of powers doctrine in
the abstract, nor to attempt an historical analysis of the traditional position of the
courts, except as a brief explanation of the necessity of a s165 obligation. The
Court accepts for these purposes that separation of powers does form part of our
law under the new Constitution, as per its earlier decision in Heath,109 but it
makes no specific mention of Heath and the interpretation of the doctrine there,
choosing instead to focus on the text of the Constitution itself within the
framework of our country's political and historical situation.
The Court rejects arguments advocating the implementation of an American test
to set boundaries on the right to free expression in one's criticism of the courts,
again finding it more desirable to examine the constitutional text itself before
resorting to foreign or even domestic precedents. The Court draws a brief
comparison between the South African Constitution and that of the USA,
describing the former as "infinitely more explicit, more detailed, more balanced,
more carefully phrased and counterpoised, representing a multi-disciplinary
effort on the part of hundreds of expert advisors and political negotiators to
produce a blueprint for the future governance of the country," compared with
the latter, which "paint[s] eighteenth century revolutionary insights in broad,
bold strokes.,,110
In other words, the Court again emphasises the need to view the text as primary
when engaging in any interpretation of the Constitution, and at one point
declares that we now have "the benefit of a constitutional environment in which
all law is to be interpreted and applied,,,111 which points again to the
considerable influence our interpretation of the Constitution exerts on every area
of our law.
Contempt of court is a common law issue, but of course it must be seen in the
light of the Constitution, and although sI65(4) does not impose any obligation
109 Note Il above
110 Mamabo (note 13 supra) par 40.
III Par 45 - and cf Constitution (note 6 supra) s39(2)
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on individuals, or the press, to assist the courts, it does support the possibility of
using legislation or "other measures" to ensure that the courts function as
desired. The Court thus concludes that "where the Constitution itself
contemplates legislative protection of these judicial qualities, it would be
difficult to uphold an argument that any measure to that end which, even
minimally, limits one or the other of the fundamental rights contained in the Bill
of Rights, is an unjustifiable infringement.v'V To summarise, the approach
used in this case gives substance to the notion of constitutional supremacy by
placing the text first, and using the context as an aid to understanding the text
itself.
3 3 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The most strikingly noticeable change in the approach of the Constitutional
Court is evident in its dealings with implicit provisions of the Constitution. If
the approach in Bernstein v Bester NOll3 is compared to that followed in the
Heath case.'!" the development of a distinctive Constitutional Court
jurisprudence is very clear. In Bernstein, the Court still has recourse to the
approach of the appellate division for a test to determine whether a
constitutional provision is 'implied by law'. In Heath, no such test is applied,
and the Court simply pronounces that it "cannot accept that an implicit
provision of the Constitution has any less force than an express provision,,,115
and assumes that separation of powers is such a term, without citing any
authority for this finding.i'"
In making this pronouncement, the Court was dispensing with the argument of
the court a quo117that, because there is no express provision referring to
separation of powers in the Constitution, the court was not competent to set
112 Par 39.
113 Note 20 supra
114 Note Il supra
IisPar20
116 This is in itself problematic, as even the obiter pronouncements on implied constitutional
provisions in Bernstein (note 20 supra) suggest that s22 read with s96(2) of the interim
Constitution Act 200 of 1993, only imply the principle of separation of powers, and this
principle actually had the force oflaw under the Constitution at that time - see note 22 supra.
17 South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath 2000 (10) BCLR 1131 (T)
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aside what would only amount to "a tacit principle of the Constitution.,,118 It
rejects the use of the designation 'tacit', in favour of the term 'implied' or
'implicit', 119and refers to the judgment of the Court in the Certification case,120
in which it was confirmed that "the provisions of our Constitution are structured
in a way that makes provision for a separation ofpowers.,,121
However, since Heath, there has been little consistency m the Court's
application of this newly recognized principle, which now forms part of our
constitutional law. The Court in Dodo and Mamabolo was at pains to point out
that it does not support an abstract adoption of the doctrine without reference to
the text of our Constitution and the manner in which it finds expression there.122
The doctrine is allegedly only accepted as part of our law to the extent that it is
contained within the provisions of the Constitution, but in practice, as an
implicit provision, it is being used as an additional substantive ground for
review of legislation. For example, in the recent case of S v Mamabolo, 123after
referring to the constitutional provision for the removal of a judge from office,
the Court states:
"The nature of the separation of powers between the judiciary on the
one hand and the legislature and executive on the other, is however
such that any other check on the judiciary by the legislature or the
executive runs the risk of endangering the independence of the
judiciary and undermining the separation of powers principle.,,124
With its importation of tests from the USA and Australia for deciding on the
acceptable extent of extra-judicial functions for judges, Heath is another
1181160A
119Note 11 supra par 19
120Note 10 supra
121Heath (note 11 supra) par 22. This is not the same as saying that separation of powers is an
implied provision in our Constitution.
122See especially Dodo (note 12 supra) par 17: "What counts is not any abstract theory of
separation of powers, but the actual separation of powers operationally defined by the
Constitution," and Heath (note 11 supra) par 22: "There can be no doubt that our Constitution
provides for such a separation [of powers], and that laws inconsistent with what the Constitution
requires in that regard, are invalid" (my emphasis).
123Note 13 supra
124Par 30. No reference is made to the constitutional text as justification for this statement;
rather it relies on the Court's interpretation of the abstract doctrine of separation of powers.
53
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
example of this practical tendency.r" It is difficult to explain why in Heath, the
Court is content to use tests drawn from these foreign jurisdictions, while in
Mamabolo, the Court finds American authorities wholly inappropriate, given
the radical differences between the United States and South African
Constitutions.126 In this case, the Court instead displays a remarkable
inventiveness and ingenuity in its interpretation of constitutional prOVISIOns
relating to separation of powers and checks and balances. 127
On the whole, the Court's level of caution, even while bringing about some
quite radical developments in interpretation, like combining the 'reading-down'
of a legislative provision with the idea of Bill of Rights guarantees as checks
and balances, as in Dodo's case,128is to be welcomed. On the other hand, the
strange reluctance in Heath to confront the core issue of whether the legislation
called into question in that case could be reconciled to the constitutional text,
regardless of what extra-judicial functions are permitted in other jurisdictions,
and whether the legislation was being implemented appropriately, can justly be
criticised.
Another noteworthy feature of the approach to the interpretation of separation of
powers is the emphasis the Court places on flexibility.V" This desire not to close
the debate concerning the extent of the separation of powers doctrine, and its
effect on the judicial role in South Africa, probably derives from the approach
of the Court in the Certification case to Constitutional Principle VI. 130However,
given the very different task with which the Court was concerned in that case,
the open-endedness of the later decisions is not necessarily appropriate. On the
other hand, the advantage is that, as a result, the effect of separation of powers
on the judicial role also remains provisional and subject to review.
125 Note Il supra par 29-30
126 See note 110 supra
127 See the discussion in this chapter at parts 3 2 5 and 3 2 6 supra.
128 See note 102 supra
129 This flexibility is particularly evident in De Lange - see the discussion at note 9 and 59 supra
- and in Heath - see the discussion at note 85 supra.
130 See especially the discussion at note 42, 43 and 46 supra.
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The remainder of this thesis will continue with an examination of the
implications of some of these decisions concerning the separation of powers
doctrine, and how they have affected the courts' understanding of the role of
judges. The question that still demands an answer is whether a judge must, to
preserve the independence guaranteed by the Constitution, be withheld from any
activities that are not directly related to what the Court has determined to be 'the
central mission of the judiciary'. This is essentially the adjudication of
adversarial disputes, although certain deviations from this central mission may
still be allowed. J3J Alternatively, the new Constitution might require that the
role of judges be re-examined, and the guarantee of independence used as an
enabling provision, allowing judges far greater freedom to take on a more
investigative and inquisitorial type of role.
The dispute in its most basic form therefore returns to the contentious issue in
De Lange v Smuts,132 namely whether the text of the Constitution guarantees the
independence of judges themselves, or if it matters whether they are sitting on
the bench hearing cases, presiding over meetings of creditors, or serving on
Special Investigating Units that actively investigate allegations of corruption.
It is worth noting that, even in Heath, a compronuse position regarding
eligibility for the post of head of a Special Investigating Unit, if a different
interpretive approach had been adopted. For example, 'reading down' the
provisions of the Special Investigating Units legislation so as to ensure that the
independence of judges was retained, or focusing on how the Units were
actually designed to function under the legislation in question, instead of on the
particular operation of Heath's Unit,133 might have brought about the
developments in the judicial role envisaged by the Special Investigating Units
legislation.
131 The extent of such deviations and the circumstances under which they might be permitted are
not clear, as the tests introduced in Heath (note 11 supra) were apparently an ad hoc measure.
132 Note 9 supra
133 The Heath Unit was considered over-zealous in its operations, and perhaps as a result, no
other Unit was ever established.
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CHAPTER 4: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND THE ROLE OF JUDGES
4 1 INTRODUCTION
Many arguments against extending the role of judges beyond that of the
disinterested adjudicator, rely primarily on the idea that involvement in tasks or
functions that require something other than adjudication tend to compromise the
independence of the judiciary, either by subjecting them to some form of
control, or simply creating the appearance of partiality in the eye of the public,
thus undermining the integrity of the courts. An extreme expression of this view
may be found in the writings of American former Chief Justice Harlan F.
Stone's, in which he opines "that it is highly undesirable for a judge to engage
actively in public or private undertakings other than the performance of his
judicial functions."l In this chapter, the validity of such arguments is
questioned, and resulting perspectives on the independence of the judiciary used
in an evaluation of recent cases dealing with separation of powers and the
judicial function.2
In the previous chapter, the development of the Constitutional Court's
interpretive approach to the separation of powers principle was analysed. This
analysis was used to determine the impact of particular interpretations of the
principle on the Court's understanding of the judicial role. This chapter
continues our enquiry into how to interpret or define the role of judges, this time
asking whether the role necessarily entails the performance of an adjudicative
role, as is traditionally expected, or whether it can also be fulfilled by
performance of extra-judicial functions.
The hypothesis here is that any function assigned to judges by the Constitution,
whether 'judicial' in the strict sense or not, and any function not in conflict with
the duty imposed on judges by the Constitution, should be considered part of the
judicial function. As has already been mentioned, the Constitutional Court did
IMason "Extra-Judicial Work for Judges: the Views of Chief Justice Stone" Harvard Law
Review (1953) 193-216203
2 The cases to be considered are Ex parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly: In re:
Certification of the Constitution of the RSA 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC), South African
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not consider the role of head of a Special Investigating Unit to be compatible
with the role of a judge. It is therefore appropriate to begin with the Heath
decision, and how the Court in that case begins to hammer out its own definition
of the judicial role.
One of the arguments used in Heath to explain the need for judicial
independence was the provision made in our Constitution for separation of
powers.' However, it is not immediately clear that the doctrine of separation of
powers is of particular assistance in interpreting the role of a judge, as assigned
by our Constitution. Although separation of powers has now been accepted as
an implicit provision of the Constitution, it also appears from the judgment that
the doctrine only applies in our law to the extent to which it is expressed within
the text of our Constitution. When establishing a constitutionally acceptable
definition of the role of South African judges, the text of the Constitution should
take precedence over the doctrine of separation of powers or any other
constitutional principle.
This approach became the trend in cases subsequent to Heath, in which the role
of the judiciary has been further examined in the light of separation of powers
and the Constitution." These cases will be analysed one by one, beginning with
Heath, and moving chronologically through Dodo and Mamabolo, in order to
demonstrate the Constitutional Court's refinement of its views on judicial
independence, separation of powers, and the role of judges.
4 2 THE BACKGROUND TO THE CONTROVERSY
The controversy surrounding the application of separation of powers to the
judicial role centred on Willem Heath, a former judge of the High Court of
South Africa. In 1995, he was appointed in terms of an Eastern Cape Provincial
Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath 2001 (1) BCLR 77 (CC), S v Dodo 2001(5)
BCLR 423 (CC) and S v Mamabola 2001 (5) BCLR 449 (CC).
3 SAAPIL v Heath (note 2 supra) par 25
4 See chapter 3 of this thesis for a more detailed description of the various approaches to




NoticeS to head a commission of inquiry into matters relating to State property
in the Eastern Cape. At that time, he was a judge of the Ciskei Supreme Court,
and the new task assigned to him was to inquire into alleged administrative
malpractices in the former Ciskei.
The success and credibility of a commission of inquiry may depend on the
personality and reputation of the chairperson appointed, and Heath soon
demonstrated a flair for attracting the attention and support of the media."
However, this kind of publicity in the media is less vital for such a commission
than it is for an official such as the Public Protector, who relies on the public to
report complaints about public administration.' Inevitably Heath, being so adept
at handling the media, was generally portrayed as a type of additional Public
Protector, while the commission soon became known in the national media
exclusively as "the Heath commission".
When the Special Investigating Units and Special Tribunals Act'' was
promulgated at the end of 1996, this commission was dissolved by president
Nelson Mandela," In its place, he proclaimed the establishment of a Special
Investigating Unit, to be headed up by Heath, which was to report to the
president on irregularities in the administration of State or public property, in
any part of South Africa. 10
Since the duties to be performed by this Unit were even wider than those of the
original Heath commission, Heath was de facto no longer able to perform any of
the ordinary functions of a judge. Instead, all his time was to be devoted to the
performance of an extra-judicial function - the investigation of alleged
corruption. Although the Special Investigating Units were intended to
investigate only matters assigned to them by the president, the Heath Unit did
not hesitate to apply to the president for proclamations, to such an extent that
5 EC Provincial Notice 10 of 1995
6 Financial Mail July 25 1997 "Cover Story: No place to hide from the long arm of Heath"
7 Brynard "Supporting Constitutional Democracy in South Africa: an Assessment of the Public
Protector (Ombudsman)" SA/PA 199934(1) 7-23: "Ombudsmen need publicity of their
activities and more importantly, of the existence 0 the office."
8 Act 74 of 1996
9 Proclamation R24 of 1997
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this particular Special Investigating Unit - and despite the provision for others
in the legislation, no others were ever established - effectively acted on own
initiative.
One of these anti-corruption initiatives, resulting from allegations of
improprieties in the paying out of claims against the Road Accident Fund, led
Heath and his Unit to open an investigation of the lawyers engaging in this type
of litigation. As a result, a group of these lawyers came together and founded
the South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers ("SAAPIL"), which,
to prevent the investigation from going ahead, sought to challenge the status of
the Special Investigating Unit itself.
The Transvaal Provincial Division, on first hearing the case, rejected SAAPIL's
arguments, but the recent Constitutional Court decision in Heath's case,
supports their contention that the scope of the courts' extra-judicial function has
been restricted by the introduction of a supreme Constitution which makes
provision for separation of powers. The Court held that Heath's role in presiding
over the Unit was not compatible with the legitimate functions of the judiciary.
The importance of judges' adhering to these legitimate functions has been
expressed in our courts as follows: "Regterlike amptenare moet in hulle
amptelike lewe hulle streng beperk tot die funksies wat aan die amp verbonde
. ,,11is.
However, in the court a quo,I2 after examining the history of appointments of
judges to do extra-judicial work, Coetzee AJ had stated that "over the past 150
years there has never been a time when judges confmed themselves to the
function of a judge." He refers to a number of examples of extra-judicial duties,
and cites various instances of their performance, both here and within other
jurisdictions, to support his conclusion that the Special Investigating Units and
10 See also Proclamation R24 of 1997
Il Hiemstra CJ, in S v Mongale 1979 (3) SA 669 (B). Literally, "Judicial officers must, in
official life, limit themselves strictly to the functions associated with their office" (my
translation).




Special Tribunals Actl3 did not violate the Constitution or the principle of
judicial independence, and that Heath's role as investigator was compatible with
his position as a judge.
4 3 JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
The principle of judicial independence has been accepted as a necessary
precondition for a credible and legitimate judiciary since at least the seventeenth
century in Britain, when the lack of security of tenure enjoyed by judges forced
them to comply with the will of the political sovereign, or face removal from the
bench." The 1701 Act of Settlement introduced a number of reforms, granting
judges tenure through political changes, salaries that were set and revised by
parliament, and removal only at the behest of both houses of parliament. These
measures have since been implemented as a matter of course in most democratic
countries, including South Africa.
However, it is not certain that these three basic tenets are sufficient guarantees
of judicial independence, or whether additional safeguards must be put in place
to ensure that the judiciary retains credibility as an independently functioning
branch of the state. Two aspects of judicial independence can be identified - the
first concerning the autonomy of the courts, and the second the immunity of
judges from civil liability for acts committed in the performance of their
function as judges.i'' These aspects both find expression in our Constitution,
which guarantees independence for the courts, and provides for investigations
into the conduct of judges only by the Judicial Service Commission." Though it
13 Note 8 supra
14 See chapter 2 for a more detailed explanation of how this principle was transmitted from
Britain to her colonies, including South Africa, and also the comments of Georgina Pickett in
"The Canadian Judicial System" Consultus Nov 1997 133-136 "At the time, it was common for
judges to be ousted with any political changes, or when politicians viewed the judges' rulings as
incorrect, creating substantial pressure on judges to make decisions according to what those
leaders wished the results to be, rather than according to the judges' interpretation of the law"
134.
15 See Pickett (note 14 supra) for further commentary on these aspects.
16 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 s165 and sl77(I)
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does not directly limit liability of judges for mistakes in adjudication, the state is
likely to incur vicarious liability for errors of this kind.17
In deciding whether the judiciary is sufficiently independent, one of the factors
that may be considered is what functions a judge is expected to perform, and
whether the judge is subject to any form of control or influence from the other
branches of state in the performance of these functions. A link therefore exists
between judicial independence and the judicial function, in the sense that judges
must be able to carry out their duties independently, and without "fear, favour or
prejudice." The need for an independent judiciary may consequently act as a
constraint upon our interpretation of the acceptable limits of the judicial
function.
The judicial function receives further attention m the Constitutional Court
judgment on Heath, in which it was held that the question at hand was
ultimately "whether or not the functions that the judge is expected to perform
are incompatible with the judicial office.,,18 In paragraph 25 of the judgment,
the Court also remarks that "[u ]nder our Constitution it is the duty of the courts
to ensure that the limits to the exercise of public power are not transgressed.
Crucial to the discharge of this duty is that the courts be and be seen to be
independent." It proceeds to conclude that the appointment of a judge to the
position of investigator under the Special Investigating Units Act violates the
principle of separation of powers, since "[t]he functions that the head of the SIU
is required to perform are far removed from the 'central mission of the
judiciary' .,,19
If the Court were indeed correct in reading the Constitution's recognition of the
three branches of state as a wholesale adoption of the separation of powers
doctrine, then all that would be necessary would be to educate the public and
other courts about the rationale for this new interpretation and the necessity for
17 Further comments on this possibility may be found in Labuschagne "Deliktuele
Aanspreeklikheid van die Staat vir Foute van die Regsprekende Gesag: Is die Oervader
Uiteindelik Ontheilig?" THRHR (59) 479-485




the resultant limitation. The value of maintaining the three separate branches is
certainly not disputed, and may be demonstrated by referring to other
jurisdictions, and to the philosophical foundations of the doctrine.
However, the Court makes it clear that, in its own opinion, "[i]t is undesirable,
particularly at this stage of the development of our jurisprudence concerning the
separation of powers, to lay down rigid tests for determining whether or not the
performance of a particular function by a judge is or is not incompatible with
the judicial office.,,20 It appears from both the Heath judgments and other
separation of powers cases that the question of the role of judges and the duty of
the courts remains a central problem in our law.
Furthermore, it is far from clear that the role of judges should be a static and
unchangeable one, informed by traditional assumptions about the nature and
limits of the judicial function.i' Another way of approaching the problem is
with the recognition that "the instruction to judges to promote the values that
underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and
freedom make it clear that judges are expected to playa far more activist role
than has previously been the case.,,22
4 4 ANALYSIS OF THE CASE LAW
4 4 1 The Certification Case
To achieve the goal of this chapter, it is necessary to consider the tests which
were used in reaching the final decision on Heath, and to evaluate these in the
light of the Constitution. As is to be expected, the role of judges and the courts
is outlined in some detail in the Constitution." The Constitution establishes an
independent and impartial judiciary, and excludes the courts from the section
20 Par 31
21 Botha "Democracy and Rights: Constitutional Interpretation in a Postrealist World" THRHR
(63) 561-581 575, where it is argued that the Constitution requires us to discard such
assumptions.
22575_6
23 Constitution (note 16 supra) Chapter 8 - Courts and the Administration of Justice, and also
Schedule 2, Item 6 - Judicial Oaths
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239 definition of "organs of state", as well as from the domain which the Public
Protector may investigate."
In the Certification-cese/? the Court refers to the judiciary's position with
respect to Constitutional Principles V, VI, and VII,26 and comes to the
conclusion that the functions assigned to judges, the structure of the courts, and
the composition and workings of the Judicial Service Commission, as set out in
the Constitution, all accord with these principles. The Court holds that an
independent judiciary is "an essential part of the separation of powers", and
points to section 165 as aiming to ensure this outcome. This section vests
judicial authority in the courts and protects courts against interference by
individuals or state organs. In this context, the Court identifies judges
themselves with the judicial authority and the courts, concluding:
"Constitutionally, therefore, all judges are independent. ,,27
There is no suggestion in the Certification judgment that any of the functions
assigned to judges, or the participation of the legislature and executive in the
appointment of judges, violate the separation of powers as expressed in
Constitutional Principle VI. The overlaps in function between the three branches
of state are easily justified with reference to the Constitutional Principle itself,
as it not only contains a stipulation that the three branches be kept separate, but
also refers to a supplementary requirement, namely that there should be
"appropriate checks and balances to ensure accountability, responsiveness and
openness." These checks and balances typically allow a measure of power-
sharing between the three branches, and prevent a rigid separation of powers
from ensuing. The Judicial Service Commission is an excellent example of such
'appropriate checks and balances', and the judicial appointment process
demonstrates interaction and power-sharing among the branches according to
this principle.
24 sI82(3) "The Public Protector may not investigate court decisions."
25 Certification case (note 2 supra)
26 Constitutional Principle V requires that the legal system should ensure equality before the law
and an equitable legal process (par 137), Constitutional Principle VI provides for a separation of
powers between the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, with checks and balances (par
123), and Constitutional Principle VII requires an appropriately qualified, independent and
impartial judiciary (par 123).
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No attempt is made in the Certification judgment to set limits to the judicial
power, but the emphasis here falls on the need for judicial independence. The
Court satisfies itself that the Constitution adequately safeguards this
independence and that the other branches cannot interfere with the courts. Since
the role of the courts is not addressed in positive terms in the Certification case,
we must tum to the Constitution itself, and existing views on the judicial
authority derived from precedents, in order to address the question of what
constitutes the primary purpose of the judiciary, and how this relates to the role
of judges.
4 4 2 South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Heath
In Heath, the Constitutional Court begins its pronouncements on the role and
function of judges reasonably enough, expressing the undesirability,
"particularly at this stage of the development of our jurisprudence concerning
the separation of powers [of laying] down rigid tests for determining whether or
not the performance of a particular function by a judge is or is not incompatible
with the judicial office.,,28
No less reasonable is the subsequent statement of the Court that "the question is
one calling for a judgment to be made as to whether or not the functions that the
judge is expected to perform are incompatible with the judicial office."
However, if this judgment should not be made at the hand of "rigid tests" laid
down by the court, it requires some other source of justification.
It is regarding this source of justification that the Court adopts a surprising
stance. The view is expressed that "the question in each case must turn upon
considerations such as those referred to by Mr Trengove, and possibly others,
which come to the fore because of the nature of the particular function under
consideration" (my emphasisj.i" The considerations referred to by Mr Trengove
27 Par 123.
28 Par 31. This suggests a willingness on the part of the Court to allow for greater flexibility in
defining the judicial role. See also chapter 5 of this thesis, in which the scope for inquisitorial




are tests distilled from United States and Australian decisions concerning extra-
judicial functions of judges, and judge Blackmun's statement summarising the
relevant American jurisprudence:
"Congress may delegate to the Judicial Branch non-adjudicatory
functions that do not trench upon the prerogative of another Branch
and that are appropriate to the central mission of the judiciary.Y"
Having approved these considerations as relevant in our constitutional
dispensation, the Court proceeds to state that, in making the judgment about
where the performance of particular functions by a judge may "materially
breach the line that has to be kept between the judiciary and the other branches
of government in order to maintain the independence of the judiciary," the
Court "may have regard to the views of the legislature and executive."
However, it fails to mention what must surely be the primary source of
justification for any such judgment - the Constitution itself.31
Despite this omISSIOn, the Court goes on to refer to a number of specific
constitutional provisions which prescribe non-adjudicative functions for judges.
Rather than using the existence of such functions to extend and develop our
understanding of the role of judges, the Court simply concludes that these
functions "are not inconsistent with the role of the judiciary in a democratic
society. ,,32 The reasons given are, in the case of judges presiding over elections
of executive and legislative functionaries, that this provision ensures "that [the
elections] are carried out impartially and strictly in accordance with
Constitutional requirements" and in the case of the giving of advice on the
administration of justice, or serving on the Judicial Service Commission, that




32 A conclusion which is perhaps superfluous, given that the Constitutional Court has already on
another occasion certified the functions assigned to the judiciary as not conflicting with the
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The fact that the Court finds it necessary to justify the Constitution's assignment
of functions to judges is in itself rather disconcerting. It suggests that, instead
of being guided by the Constitution to an understanding of the role of judges,
the Court is attempting to test the functions assigned to judges against some
external conception of the role of a judge. Furthermore, a lack of consistency is
demonstrated, in that this judgment is made without referring to the question of
whether such functions would stand up to the relevant imported American and
Australian tests, and more importantly, whether these tests are in fact
compatible with our Constitution.
Despite these problems, the Court goes on to reject the reasoning followed in
the court a quo that the performance of extra-judicial functions is part of the
historical role of judges and should therefore be permitted. The Court finds that
this is no longer an appropriate function for judges, because the tradition in
question comes from the era of parliamentary sovereignty, and "what is now
permissible must be determined in the light of our new Constitution, and not
necessarily by past practices.t''" It apparently ignores the principles concerning
the role of judges that might be drawn from serious engagement with the
functions assigned to judges by the Constitution and their implications, and
ironically seems to miss the point that the new Constitution does not assign
judges a purely adjudicative role.
443 SvDodo
In S v Dodo/" the Constitutional Court again considered the question of how the
separation of powers doctrine influences the role of the courts, and the extent to
which it finds application in our law. The context in which these
pronouncements are made is the question of whether mandatory minimum life
sentences, prescribed by legislation for certain crimes or types of crime, are
constitutionally valid and enforceable. There was no question here, as in Heath,
Constitutional Principles, including Constitutional Principle VI which refers to separation of
f:0wers - see Certification case (note 2 supra).
3 Heath (note 2 supra) par 33
34 Note 2 supra
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of the courts' having exceeded their constitutional powers, but rather of the
legislature's attempting to encroach upon the prerogative of the judiciary.
The order of the court a quo35 was that s51(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment
Ace6 was in conflict with, amongst other constitutional provisions, the
separation of powers principle under the Constitution, and should be struck
down. This order had to be confirmed by the Constitutional Court, but the
argument that had convinced the Eastern Cape High Court did not succeed
before South Africa's highest court.
In the Constitutional Court judgment, the High Court's reasons for opposing the
legislation introducing mandatory life sentences are given as follows: the
sentence prescribed by the legislation is very extreme, and is the most severe
sentence that can be lawfully imposed by the court. This means that the court
must carefully weigh all relevant factors before imposing it. This discretionary
balancing of factors falls within the exclusive prerogative of the judiciary. The
court states, using the terminology of Heath: "It falls within the heartland of the
judicial power, and is not to be usurped by the legislature.t'V
The Constitutional Court, however, did not deem this striking down of the
legislation to be necessary, and uses the legislative "escape clause" allowing the
courts to impose a lesser sentence if "substantial and compelling circumstances"
exist, read with the Bill of Rights provisions for a fair trial, and the right not to
be subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punisbment.i" as
granting sufficient discretion to the courts to avoid conflict with the separation
of powers.
The Court does not assume the helplessness of the judiciary in the face of
legislation that is possibly excessively draconian, or which allows deviation
from its prescribed sentences only in the most extreme cases, but rather takes as
its overriding consideration the fact that the duty of the judiciary is to uphold the
35 Summarised in Dodo (note 2 supra) par 4-9
36 Act 105 of 1997
37 Dodo (note 2 supra) par 8
38 Constitution (note 16 supra) s35 and s12 respectively
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provisions of a supreme Constitution. The legislature does not have the power
to defeat the purposes of the Bill of Rights, and the courts can therefore never be
compelled by legislative means to do so either. The Court also refers to the
attitude of courts under our previous dispensation, finding authority for the view
that even in a state in which parliamentary sovereignty obtains, "Courts will not
be astute to find that a mandatory sentence has been prescribed. ,,39
4 4 4 S v Mamabolo
In Kriegler J's judgment in Mamabolo, with which the majority of the
Constitutional Court agreed, though Judge Sachs wrote a separate concurring
judgment, the summary proceedings for contempt of court cases and the
common law charge of 'scandalising the court' were subjected to constitutional
scrutiny. The Court found that, although the common law crime of 'scandalising
the court' did infringe on the right to freedom of expression.l" the infringement
could be justified under the limitations clause in the Bill of Rights;" provided
that the Court was satisfied that "the offending conduct, viewed contextually,
really was likely to damage the administration ofjustice.,,42
As to the summary proceedings for dealing with these cases, the Court found
that the procedure was unsatisfactory in many respects, and concluded that it
ordinarily constituted "a wholly unjustifiable limitation of individual rights and
must not be employed.T'' Instead, the usual processes for the prosecution of
offences should be followed, to give effect to the fair trial rights contained in the
Bill of Rights.44 The procedure is also held to conflict with the nature and
function of the judicial branch of state, as "it is inherently inappropriate for a
court of law, the constitutionally designated primary protector of personal rights
and freedoms, to pursue such a course of conduct. ,.45
39 S v Tom; S v Bruce 1990 (2) SA 802 (A) at p.807, quoted inDodo (note 2 supra) par 21
40 Constitution (note 16 supra) s16
41 s36(1)
42 Mamabo (note 2 supra) par 45
43 Par 58
44 Constitution (note 16 supra) s35
4S Mamabo (note 2 supra) par 58
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From this it should be apparent that the question of the role and function of
judges also features prominently in this case, and the description that follows,
covers some of the pronouncements on this issue that relate to the separation of
powers doctrine, and how it affects the judicial role. The Court acknowledges
the judiciary as a completely independent pillar of state, constitutionally
mandated to exercise the state's judicial authority. It then makes this comment:
"Under the doctrine of separation of powers [the judiciary] stands
on an equal footing with the executive and the legislative pillars of
state; but in terms of political, financial or military power it cannot
hope to compete.?"
Nevertheless, the dictum in Coetzee v Government of the RSA47 that "the rule of
law requires that the dignity and authority of the courts, as well as their capacity
to carry out their functions, should always be maintained," is cited here with
approval, and with the conclusion that this dictum places an obligation on the
judiciary to establish a quantity of 'moral authority' as surrogate for the political
power that it lacks. This should enable the judiciary to perform 'its vital
function' as "the interpreter of the Constitution, the arbiter in disputes between
organs of state and, ultimately, as the watchdog over the Constitution and its
Bill of Rights - even against the state.?"
In this description of the judicial function, the non-adjudicative part, in which
the court functions as an executive check is, at least by implication, accorded
due recognition. It is this part of the 'vital function' of judges that finds
expression where judges are called upon, for example, to serve on the Judicial
Service Commission, or a presidential commission of inquiry.Ï'
It is also interesting that the Court holds that the crime of contempt of court is a
'public injury', damaging to the administration of justice.i" and with the sole
46 Par 16
47 1995 (10) BCLR 1382 (CC) par 61
48 Mamabo (note 2 supra) par 16
49 Constitution (note 16 supra) s178(1)(a)-(c) and s84(2)(f) respectively.
50 Mamabo (note 2 supra) par 25
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aim of preserving "the capacity of the judiciary to fulfill its role under the
Constitution.?" However, the charge of 'scandalising the court' is not to be
confused with the democratic check on the judicial power which vocal public
criticism constitutes, which is an essential function that cannot be taken over by
the executive or legislative branches without compromising the independence of
the courts and undermining the principle of separation of powers. 52 This
democratic check functions most effectively where the integrity of the judiciary
is not impugned, and the legitimacy of the judicial process is not undermined.
Since there is no straightforward or completely reliable test for where criticism
crosses the boundary between acceptable scrutiny and harmful or damaging
'scandalising', the subsequent decision that the summary proceedings for
hearing such contempt of court cases are unconstitutional is all the more
understandable. To summarise, the Court in this case adopts a particular
political reserve, shying away from the exercise of power, and portraying itself
as a comparatively weak institution, strengthened only by integrity and moral
authority.
4 5 CONCLUSIONS
In the preceding analysis of the different approaches of the Court to the question
of how the judicial function is affected by the Constitution, and by the
separation of powers principle, the lack of unanimity about the role of judges,
even within the Constitutional Court, is demonstrated. The problem is, as Botha
points out, that "[d]espite the radical premises of the Constitution, judges
continue to be constrained by assumptions about the nature and limits of the
judicial function.Y'
This does not necessarily mean that there is no scope for the development of an
extended role for judges, in which they may continue to enhance their moral
authority and vigorously promote the values and principles entrenched in the
51 Par 45
52 Par 30
53 Note 21 supra 577. This is probably more true of the lower courts and the High Courts, but
even the Constitutional Court, in the Heath decision, seemed to make these kinds of assumption.
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Constitution. Many extra-judicial functions which judges may be called upon to
perform, might not be easy to classify as belonging to any particular branch of
the state, but relate directly to the vital function of protecting and upholding the
Constitution.
For example, as will be pointed out more clearly in chapter 5, the legislation on
which the Heath Special Investigating Unit was founded, demonstrates many
similarities with the Public Protector Act, which regulates the functions of the
Public Protector and was promulgated at the order of the Constitution". The
office of the Public Protector was established in the 1996 Constitution as one of
the independent "State Institutions Supporting Constitutional Democracy't.f
These institutions, like the Special Investigating Units, do not fall naturally into
the category of either executive, legislative or judicial, although they sometimes
act as executive checks.
The existence of these types of function is a further indication of the positive
effects for the judiciary of a supreme Constitution, containing broad directives
and a set of values within which judges have a good deal of interpretive space in
which to manoeuvre. This finds expression in Mamabolo where the Court
indicates that it now has "the benefit of a constitutional environment in which
all law is to be interpreted and applied.T" Within this constitutional
environment, the role and function of the judiciary may also be re-interpreted.
An examination of the implications of such a re-interpretation follows in the
final chapter.
54 Constitution (note 16 supra) s182(1) and (2)
55 Chapter 9
56 Note 2 supra par 45
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CHAPTER 5: EXECUTIVE CHECKS AND ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS - THE
FATE OF HEATH'S SPECIAL INVESTIGATING UNIT
5 1 INTRODUCTION
South Africa's new Constitution I is a complex and detailed document, that
guarantees fundamental rights, provides for its own sovereignty' and assigns
powers and functions to the various organs of state. Beyond that, it places
checks on these powers and ensures its supremacy by creating constitutional
enforcement mechanisms. Examples of formal limitations on state power
identified in the interim Constitution.' and still relevant under the final text,
include the following: the Constitutional Court may apply the Bill of Rights to
test the actions of the executive and parliament; the Offices of the Auditor-
General, Public Protector and Human Rights Commission ensure that the state
respects rights and performs its functions efficiently and accountably; and the
courts may review administrative action."
In the context of these constitutional provisions and limitations, this chapter
attempts to identify an appropriate place for Special Investigating Units,5 and to
outline their role as supportive institutions in a constitutional democracy. This
entails both an explanation of the rationale for their existence, and a comparison
of the operation of two particular executive checks," namely the Public
Protector's office and the Special Investigating Units.
In the first part, the types of executive checks and enforcement mechanisms
introduced by the new Constitution are identified, and the circumstances
1 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996
2 Constitution (note 1 supra) s2
3 Act 200 of 1993
4 Venter "Parliamentary Control and Ministerial Responsibility under the New South African
Constitution" Strategic Review for South Africa 16(2) Nov 199471-9791. Klug "Constitutional
Law" Annual Survey of South African Law 19941-12 refers to the creation of protective
institutions to support "[ijndividual protection against government abuse and
maladministration" 10. See also Rautenbach & Malherbe Constitutional Law (1994) 180-185 for
other examples.
5 The Special Investigating Units were created under the Special Investigating Units and
Tribunals Act 74 of 1996.
6 The executive branch of state is responsible for administration of the state and is usually
considered particularly susceptible to abuses of power. Historically, South Africa has also
experienced particular problems in this area - see Du Plessis & Corder Understanding South
Africa's Transitional Bill of Rights (1994) 191.
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through which they came to be included in our Constitution explored. Special
attention is given to the previous constitutional position in South Africa, in
which the legislature was sovereign, and executive policies frequently
influenced the courts and threatened their independence.
In the next part, two specific forms of executive checks, namely the Public
Protector and Special Investigating Units, are compared with one another, and
comparisons drawn between the two sets of legislation governing their
operation. After this, the relationship between these two institutions is
examined, in order to explain their differences and similarities. This also
requires an analysis of the intended function of Special Investigating Units, and
consideration of the possibility that, if they had been established in the form
envisaged for them, these Units might have introduced a new understanding of
the judicial function.
Finally, some alternative ways of dealing with the Special Investigating Units
are suggested. The outcome of the recent Heath decision has meant that the
legislation under which the Units operate requires amendment. Suggested
improvements to the legislation rely on the arguments and analyses in this
chapter and the preceding ones, and in the concluding part of the chapter, these
alternative suggestions are examined.
5 2 CONSTITUTIONAL ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS
Turning now to the rationale for the existence of constitutional enforcement
mechanisms, it is apparent that the need to prevent constitutional provisions and
limitations on power from becoming mere 'parchment barriers' 7 is nothing new
or in any way unique to South Africa. The basic argument is expressed as
follows by Vattel, an eighteenth century writer on fundamental laws: "The
Constitution of a state and its laws are the foundation of public peace and the
7 This ubiquitous concern is expressed in these terms in Hamilton, Madison & Jay The
Federalist Papers (1987) Number XLVIII: "Will it be sufficient to mark, with precision, the
boundaries of these departments [ie. The executive, judicial and legislative branch] in the
constitution of government, and to trust to these parchment barriers against the encroaching
spirit of power?" 309
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firm support of political authority," but to operate as intended, they must be
respected by the whole nation, including those in authority. He warns that "the
Constitution and laws of a state are rarely attacked from the front, it is against
secret and gradual attempts that a nation must chiefly guard.:" One of the ways
to guard against such erosions is to create enforcement mechanisms for
constitutional provisions, as has been done in the South African Constitution.
The argument is extended, and expressed in more familiar contemporary
terminology, by Du Plessis and Corder, who state that "[t]he ultimate success of
any human rights regime depends on a range of factors, among them a political
willingness by the executive and legislative arms of government to respect
entrenched rights, [and] widespread knowledge, accessibility and legitimacy of
rights protection among the population as a whole.,,9 The most important factor
is identified by these writers as "the interpretive policy adopted by the members
of the courts whose task it is to give life to the words used in any Bill of
Rights. ,,10
Chapter 2 has already outlined the variety of interpretive approaches adopted by
our Constitutional Court, but the main implication of the above statement is that
courts with the authority and responsibility to ensure that the Constitution is
protected and upheld should exist, and it is for this reason that judges are
required to take an oath or solemnly affirm that they will ''uphold and protect
the Constitution and the human rights entrenched in it, and will administer
justice to all persons alike without fear, favour or prejudice." I I
However, though the role of judges in upholding to Constitution is crucial, it is
not the only mechanism for the enforcement of rights. Du Plessis and Corder
envisage mechanisms operating at two levels, one aiming to transform the legal
profession, making lawyers thoroughly familiar with the Constitution and
8 Vattel The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law applied to the Conduct and to the
Affairs of Nations and of Sovereigns quoted in Haines The American Doctrine of Judicial
Supremacy (1959) 41-42.
9 Du Plessis & Corder Understanding South Africa's Transitional Bill of Rights (note 9 supra)
191
10 191
II Constitution (note 1 supra) Schedule 2 Item 6(1)
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ensunng their accessibility to all South Africans, while the other alms "to
establish a 'culture' of accountability to the people in the minds of all those
participating in government, as well as propagating widespread familiarity with
the availability of human rights protection in the popular mind."12 This latter
aim, and the institutions created to realise it, is what primarily concerns us in
this chapter.
The culture of accountability finds its constitutional grounding in the very first
section of the Constitution, which establishes democratic government as a
founding value, "to ensure accountability, responsiveness and openness.t'i'' To
be effective, checks on the executive and constitutional enforcement
mechanisms must operate independently of the authorities whose powers they
tend to limit. Some of our constitutional checks, such as the state institutions
created to strengthen constitutional democracy.i" are completely independent of
any branch or organ of state, while others, such as the Constitutional Court,
form part of a particular branch, but operate independently of the other
branches.15
Rautenbach and Malherbe, in their analysis of executive checks, divide control
over executive bodies into three main categories, namely public control,
parliamentary control and judicial control.i" Judicial control corresponds
largely to the first aim of constitutional enforcement mechanisms, as mentioned
above, and includes the usual remedies of administrative law, such as review or
appeal, interdict, mandamus and the right to appeal directly to the Constitutional
Court, which is empowered to review all executive conduct, including acts of
the president. 17
Public control includes the press, public gatherings, interest groups in the
community, and cultural institutions. These forms of control are not
12 Du Plessis & Corder Understanding South Africa's Transitional Bill of Rights (note 9 supra)
191
13 Constitution (note 1 supra) sI(d). This provision emphasises the relevance of this particular
value to the executive branch of the state.
14 Constitution (note 1 supra) Chapter 9
15 s165
16 Rautenbach & Malherbe Constitutional Law (1994) 180 et seq.
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constitutionally regulated, but are protected by the Bill of Rights. For instance,
s 16 of the Constitution guarantees the right to freedom of expression, and
specifically mentions the freedom of the press and other media, and academic
freedom and freedom of scientific research, which are generally acknowledged
as "of major importance in any democratic state.?" A related right is the s18
right to freedom of association, which allows individuals to group together and
'jointly form views on matters of public interest.,,19
However, the final form of control, parliamentary control, is more directly
relevant here as a constitutionally implemented executive check. Various forms
of parliamentary control exist, but the focus here is on investigative committees
and other institutions, that report to parliament. These include both internal
parliamentary committees, and independent bodies, such as the Auditor-General
and Public Protector, which are authorised and funded via parliament, though
they are not staffed or controlled by members of parliament. It is interesting that
Rautenbach and Malherbe also include presidential commissions of inquiry, the
appointment of which the Constitution assigns to the president.i" and which may
also investigate executive actions, as part of the parliamentary control, since
these commissions tend to report also to parliament. In such cases, the executive
institutes a check on itself, but the commission appointed is not solely
accountable to the president, and thereby retains credibility as long as it is not
interfered with in carrying out its assigned investigations.
A more recent example of an executive check that could be initiated by the
president was the implementation of legislation allowing the president to
appoint Special Investigating Units to investigate certain forms of corruption
and maladministration. This legislation will enjoy further attention below.
17 Constitution (note 1 supra) sI67(4)(e) & (5)
18 Rautenbach & Malherbe (note 16 supra)
19 Note 16 supra
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5 3 COMPARISON OF THE PUBLIC PROTECTOR AND SIU LEGIS LATION
Now that the context in which institutions such as the Public Protector and
Special Investigating Units operate has been defined, the legislative framework
in which they function will be examined. The Public Protector's office was
created under the Constitution as an independently functioning organ of state,
subject to only the Constitution and the law, and accountable to the National
Assembly. Since the purpose for which the Public Protector exists is to act as a
watchdog over "any conduct in state affairs, or in the public administration in
any sphere of government.?" it seems to be closely connected with the
executive branch.
Yet, like the courts, it is said to be independent and impartial. So far it has
proved possible to accept the Public Protector's impartiality.r' despite this close
connection. The head of the Special Investigating Unit, on the other hand, was
taken to be performing an executive functionj" even though, as a High Court
judge, the independence and impartiality of this person is also constitutionally
guaranteed.i" A good starting point in attempting to understand this seeming
contradiction, is to analyse and compare the legislation responsible for the
Public Protector's operation with that of a Special Investigating Unit.
The legislation pertaining to the Public Protector establishes the Public Protector
on a very similar footing to that of a judge of the High Court. Moreover, High
Court judges are first among those listed in the Public Protector Act25 as eligible
for appointment to the position of Public Protector, the others being experienced
legal practitioners, academics, or persons with experience in the administration
20 Constitution (note 1 supra) s84(2)(f)
21 This includes an investigative function, and not just passive observation.
22 Brynard "Supporting Constitutional Democracy in South Africa: An Assessment of the Public
Protector (Ombudsman)" SAIPA 34 (1) 1999 states that "it can safely be predicted that the
institution has the potential to make a significant contribution to constitutional democracy in
South Africa and that it will be part of our constitutional dispensation for a long time to come."
See however Prof David Unterhalter's criticism of the Public Protector's recent actions in
investigating the state's controversial arms procurement deal, in which he states that "to require
someone to forego their civil claim is possibly an improper exercise of [the public protector's]
rower." Soggot and Brummer Mail & Guardian 10-16 August 2001.
3 South African Personal Injury Lawyers' Association v Heath 2001 (1) BCLR 77 (CC) par 46
24 Constitution (note 1 supra) s165.
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of justice, for instance, from the offices of the National or Provincial Directors
of Public Prosecutions.
The argument could be made that, in passing the Special Investigating Units
Act,26 the legislature was effectively creating a similar check on the executive,
not necessarily assigning executive functions as such to the Unit. In short, the
distinction is drawn in our Constitution between the executive authority, and
checks on the executive such as the Chapter 9 institutions supporting
constitutional democracy.
Despite references in our case law to the 'Montesquieuan principle of a
threefold separation of state power,27 as a doctrine newly incorporated into our
jurisprudence by the Constitution, the reality of how the South African state is
constituted is far more complex than this simple division into legislature,
executive and judiciary. Apart from the three branches, our Constitution also
refers to three spheres of government, namely the National, Provincial and
Local,28 which constitute the legislative and executive branches of government.
At the local government level, moreover, these two branches are virtually
indistinguishable.Ï"
The structure of the judicial authority is also tiered, but according to a different
system, with courts at four basic levels, corresponding to the Constitutional
Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal, the High Courts, and the Magistrates
Courts, explicitly named by the Constitution, which also provides for other
courts to be established by the legislature, with status similar to the latter two of
these four types.30
2S Act 23 of 1994, amended by the Public Protector Amendment Act 113 of 1998, see sIA(3)
26 Note 5 supra
27 Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional Assembly, in re: Certification of the Constitution
of the RSA, 19961996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) par 6 and Constitutional Principle VI; see Chapter
IV A of the judgment.
28 Constitution (note 1 supra) s40.
29 Chapter 7: Local Goverment, especially sI51(2), which states: "The executive and legislative




Furthermore, there are a number of constitutional institutions established 'to
support constitutional democracy', which do not fall easily into anyone of the
three branches of state, but would be defined as 'organs of state' in terms of
s239 of the Constitution. These include the Independent Broadcasting
Authority, the Independent Electoral Commission and the Human Rights
Commission, as well as the Public Service Commission. Some of these state
organs fall into the category of constitutional enforcement mechanisms, while
others operate as executive checks.
There is a marked similarity, in particular, between the role of Special
Investigating Units and the office of the Public Protector, which may be seen in
the similarities in the legislation governing each of these institutions. Both the
head of a Special Investigating Unit and the Public Protector are appointed by
the President. 31 More significantly, both are required by legislation to submit
regular reports to the National Assernbly.Y The Public Protector's report is also
tabled at the National Council of Provinces, while the Special Investigating Unit
must also report to the President.
As far as the functioning of the two institutions is concerned, both enjoy a large
degree of operational independence. There is a certain connection between the
Public Protector's office and the minister of justice, who appoints the Deputy
Public Protectors, and determines their conditions of employment, after
consultation with the Public Protector.r' but the office is open to requests from
anyone to investigate matters, and may also act on its own initiative.i"
The Special Investigating Unit receives its instructions on what it should
investigate by means of presidential proclamations." and is required to perform
any additional functions, not in conflict with the Special Investigating Units
31 The former in terms ofs3(1) of the Special Investigating Units Act (note 5 supra), and the
latter in terms ofslA(2) of the Public Protector Act (note 25 supra).
32 Public Protector Act (note 25 supra) s8(2)(a) and (b) and Special Investigating Units Act
(note 5 supra) s4(1)(f),(g) and (h).
33 Public Protector Act (note 25 supra) s3(2)
34 s6
35 Special Investigating Units Act (note 5 supra) s2(1)
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Act, requested by the President.36 Presumably, before the amendment of this
Act, while the head of the Unit was required to be a High Court judge, such
functions would also not have been permitted to conflict with that person's duty
to uphold the Constitution and the law.37
By this token, the restriction of eligibility for head of a Special Investigating
Unit to High Court judges, in terms of s3(1) of the Special Investigating Units
Act, could be seen as ensuring the independence and impartiality of the person
in this position, since these qualities are guaranteed for judges by the
Constitution. The Public Protector, whose office is established by the
Constitution, enjoys similar independence.
The remuneration and security of tenure of both the Public Protector and the
head of a Special Investigating Unit are similar, with s2(2)(a) and (b) of the
Public Protector Act granting the Public Protector no less remuneration than that
of a High Court judge, and protecting these benefits from reduction during the
Public Protector's seven-year term of officer"
Section lA(3) of the Public Protector Act specifies a wider category of persons
eligible for the office of Public Protector, which is comparable to the category
from which judges might be appointed. First listed as suitable candidates,
moreover, are High Court judges. Section 9 of the Act creates an offence of
"contempt of the Public Protector", similar to the offence of contempt of court.
The office can thus be seen as a kind of hybrid of justice administration and
court, which, like the Special Investigating Unit, is not easily classified as
executive, and also performs no adjudicative functions. An alternative
formulation is that the Public Protector's office enjoys a similar status to the
courts, but fulfills a different role in the administration of justice.
The most significant difference between these two institutions is that, while the
Public Protector is a constitutionally created and recognised institution, the
36 s4(1)(e)
37 Constitution (note 1 supra) Schedule 2, Item 6(1)
38 By way of a further comparison, Constitutional Court judges are appointed for a non-
renewable term of 12 years - see Constitution (note 1 supra) sI76(1).
80
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Special Investigating Units are created by legislation, and used to derive
constitutional protection indirectly, in that the Constitution guarantees the
independence and tenure of High Court judges. Now that judges are no longer
eligible for appointment in the position of head of a Special Investigating Unit,
the Units are far more vulnerable to executive interference.
5 4 SPECIAL INVESTIGATING UNITS AND THE ROLE OF JUDGES
When the legislation governing Special Investigating Units was drafted and
promulgated, the goal of the Units was not necessarily, despite the similarities
described in the previous part of this chapter, simply to duplicate the operations
and functions of the Public Protector's office, or to compete with the Public
Protector for matters to investigate. Their goal could also be interpreted as
introducing a new dimension to the role of judges, over and above their
traditional function of presiding over the courts. In terms of the Constitution, the
primary function of a judge is not simply the fulfillment of an official position,
on the bench, but is consistently linked with the constitutional ideal, initially
expressed in s2 of the Constitution, that the Constitution must be protected and
upheldr" This is confirmed in s165(2), which assigns to the courts the duty of
applying the Constitution and the law "impartially, and without fear, favour or
prejudice," while the judges' oath binds all judges to "uphold and protect the
Constitution and the human rights entrenched in it, and will administer justice to
all persons alike without fear, favour or prejudice, in accordance with the
Constitution and the law.',40
Although the Constitution tends to conflate the judges and judicial authority,
and identify them with the courts, it does also allow for the performance, by
judicial officers and especially the president of the Constitutional Court, of
extra-judicial functions unrelated to the operations of the courts. The form of
separation of powers contained in our Constitution, therefore, does not envisage
a strict separation, in which the judiciary is held exclusively to a judicial role,
39 Constitution (note 1 supra) s2 "This Constitution is the supreme law of the Republic; law or
conduct inconsistent with it is invalid, and the obligations imposed by it must be fulfilled."
40 Schedule 2 Item 6.
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but is flexible enough to accommodate extra-judicial functions, provided that
these are in line with the duty of judges to protect the Constitution. Within this
understanding of the role of the judiciary, it becomes possible to conceive of a
legal system in which judges may, in circumstances which require such conduct
of them for the protection of the Constitution, act in non-traditional, even
inquisitorial ways, not only when chairing commissions of inquiry, or leaving
the bench to take up an appointment at the Public Protector's office, but by
being appointed as head of a Special Investigating Unit, in terms of the
legislation analysed above.
This new understanding of the judicial role, which relies on an interpretive
approach to the Constitution that emphasises the judge's role as protector of the
Constitution, thus expanding the definition of the role to allow the judiciary to
become a constitutional enforcement mechanism or type of judicial check on the
executive as a matter of course. The Constitutional Court's interpretation in
Heath, discussed in the previous chapter, precludes this kind of expansion, and
restricts the role of judges to a primarily adjudicative function that excludes
involvement in investigations of the type envisaged by the Special Investigating
Units legislation. Involvement in such extra-judicial activities is seen as
compromising the courts' independence, and falling outside of the central
mission of the judiciary, thus conflicting with the principle of separation of
powers.
It is perhaps understandable that the Constitutional Court reacted to the Special
Investigating Units legislation in this rather conservative way, however, given
the de facto operations of the Heath Unit. Rather than waiting for the president
to assign matters to it for investigation, this Unit tended to function proactively,
applying for presidential proclamations whenever it discovered an alleged
misappropriation of funds or other irregularity." To all intents and purposes, the
Unit was functioning like an additional Public Protector or Auditor-General, and
41 Mail &Guardian (note 22 supra)
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In some cases was even competing with these institutions for the right to
investigate particular matters.42
The Special Investigating Units legislation makes room for more than one Unit
to operate at any given time, apparently envisaging the investigation of
controversial and complex matters by various High Court judges, who would,
on completing each inquisitorial assignment, resume their usual role as
arbitrators of adversarial disputes. Compare this to Heath's Unit, which built up
a considerable backlog of matters to investigate, to the extent that it became
clear that Judge Heath would probably never return to the bench, and the Unit
would never be wound Up.43
The legislation aims to facilitate and regulate the appointment of numerous
'judicial commissions of inquiry', under the name 'Special Investigating Units' ,
although in effect it was used to create an extra Public Protector. Instead of
extending the judicial function by introducing a new extra-judicial function for
judges, the effect of the legislation was limited to the creation of an additional
executive check, headed up by a judge who was no longer concerned with any
adjudicative functions at all. In the next part of this chapter, some alternative
legislative means to accomplish the goals set out for the Special Investigating
Units, which the Constitutional Court would not allow them to achieve by this
means, are investigated.
5 5 ALTERNATIVE LEGISLATIVE ApPROACHES TO SPECIAL INVESTIGATING
UNITS
Given that the outcome of the Heath case44 was the striking down of certain
sections of the Special Investigating Units Act, and in particular, the
requirement that the head of a Unit should be a judge," it follows that
amendments to this legislation are required. The first consequence of the
42 The most compelling example of this was the much publicised competition over who should
investigate the controversial government arms deal.
43 Heath (note 23 supra) par 41
44 Heath (note 23 supra)
45 Par 46 and 70
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decision in Heath was that Judge Willem Heath was required to step down from
his position as head of the Unit, and has since resigned from the bench," and
that former ANC MP Willie Hofmeyr has been appointed in his place."
There have as yet been no substantial changes to the Unit's functioning or
position, but an internal audit of the Unit has led to an attempt to address some
of the issues raised by the Constitutional Court. The report and suggestions,
which Hofmeyr has adopted, were put forward by Jan Henning, special director
of court management at the National Directorate of Public Prosecutions, at the
order of Penuell Maduna, Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development."
In the light of these developments, and the insights concerning the performance
of extra-judicial functions by judges gained from the case analyses and
considerations of separation of powers, two alternative solutions to the problems
with the Special Investigating Units legislation, identified in the Heath
judgment, might be considered. Either of these would be preferable to the
current position, in which the Units are potentially vulnerable to executive
control and might become ineffective as executive checks.
The first approach, which accords with many of the recommendations of the
Henning report, recognises the desirability of protecting the independence and
legitimacy of the Units, which is the most important goal of any revisions to the
legislation. It also respects the view put forward in Heath that the primary role
of a judge should be adjudicative.Ï' It solves the problem of how to secure the
position of the head of a Unit as an independent and impartial agent, by creating
a branch within the office of the Auditor-General that fulfils the investigative
role currently assigned to the Units.
In effect, the Special Investigating Units legislation would have to be
incorporated into the legislation governing the Auditor-General, in the form of a
special unit that investigates corruption and the misappropriation of public
46 News24 June 14,2001 "Decision on Heath 'Irregular" and ''No need to reply to Heath"
47 News24 July 30,2001 "Anti-corruption Laws need Teeth"
48 Ngobeni Mail &Guardian 10-16 August 2001.
49 Note 23 supra par 45
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money, according to directives issued by presidential proclamation. 50 This
special unit could then simply refer any evidence of misconduct to the National
Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP), and deliver reports via the usual
channels." It is doubtful that the head of this special unit could be called upon
to perform any other functions at the request of the president, but it might be
possible provided that there are appropriate safeguards to ensure that such
requests do not undermine the independence of the Auditor-General's office.
The recovery of funds via civil litigation within the Special Tribunals might be
achieved by incorporating such a function in the Public Protector Act, using as
justification sI82( I)(c) of the Constitution, which gives the Public Protector the
power, as regulated by National legislation, "to take appropriate remedial
action" when confronted with any evidence of improper conduct.
Appointments to head up this branch could be done on a similar basis as is the
practice established by the current Auditor-General or even Public Protector
legislation, meaning that judges of the High Court might again be eligible for
appointment, but with the benefit that they may then resign from the bench
without losing their independence, which will be constitutionally guaranteed as
soon as they become part of the Auditor-General's office.
The second approach is to preserve the current Special Investigating Units
legislation as intact as possible, while still changing the role of the head of a
Unit, making the position compatible with the judicial role, so that a judge could
continue to fill it. This would involve the 'reading down' of certain provisions
of the legislation, and the amendment of others. The powers of litigation, for
example, would have to be repealed, and instead the NDPP and Public
Protector's office would be given the responsibility for any criminal
prosecutions and the recovery of public funds.
SO The Henning report (M&G note 48 supra) terms the need to apply for a proclamation a
hindrance to the Unit's effectiveness, which ensconcing it within the Auditor-General's office
may help to remove, as the Auditor-General may investigate on its own initiative - see
Constitution (note 1 supra) s188.
51 Constitution (note 1 supra) sI88(3).
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All requests made by the president for the head of a Special Investigating Unit
to perform certain functions, as well as any presidential proclamations affecting
the Unit, should be subjected to the test of whether they compromise the
integrity and independence of the head of a Unit, who is, as a judge, bound by
an oath or solemn declaration to uphold the Constitution. In this alternative
approach, it is the judicial function of acting as a check on the executive which
is emphasised.
Although in many ways, this second solution to the problems with the
legislation, retaining a judge as head of a Unit, is preferable to the first, as it
places the Units in a very strong position to act as an enforcement mechanism
for various constitutional provisions. It also means that the judicial branch
would be empowered to act as an effective check on the executive, in
performance of a non-adjudicative task. However, in the wake of the Heath
case, this might be considered undesirable, and it has the added drawback of
creating an institutional check which is not recognised explicitly by the
Constitution.
If instead the first option is adopted, incorporating the Special Investigating
Units into an independent institution supporting constitutional democracy, that
is established by the Constitution itself, this has the additional benefit of
enjoying support from a number of other institutions, and has also found favour
with the staff of the Unit itself. 52 Furthermore, if such an approach were
followed, the need to extend the definition of the judicial role would not be
directly pursued any further, thereby giving effect to the Constitutional Court's
desire to leave this question open for further debate and development. 53
52 Note 48 supra. The Henning report has been approved by the SIU staff, and the Auditor-
General is apparently willing to consider it.
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